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What Went Wrong: Prudent Management of Endowment
Funds and Imprudent Endowment Investing Policies
James J. Fishman

Most colleges and universities of all sizes have an
endowment, a fund that provides a stream of income and
maintains the corpus of the fund in perpetuity. Organizations
with large endowments, such as colleges, universities, and
private foundations, all finance a significant part of their
operations through the return received from the investment of
this capital. This article examines the legal framework for
endowment investing, endowment investing policies, their
evolution to more sophisticated and riskier strategies, and the
consequences evinced during the financial crisis of 2008 and
beyond. It traces the approaches to endowment investing and
chronicles the rise and, if not the fall, the challenges to modern
portfolio management. It examines the impact of endowment
losses on colleges and universities and their constituencies, as
well as the problem of trustee deference to boards' investment
committees. This article concludes that universities have
learned little from the financial crisis and are more invested in
illiquid, nontransparent assets than before the financial crisis.
Finally, this article recommends the establishment of board.
level risk management committees to evaluate endowment
investing policies.
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APPENDIX I: UNIVERSITY BUDGET CUTS AND AUSTERITY EFFORTS ........243

INTRODUCTION
Most colleges and universities of all sizes have an endowment, a fund
that provides a stream of income and maintains the corpus of the fund in
perpetuity. 1 Organizations with large endowments, such as colleges,
universities, and private foundations, 2 all finance a significant part of their

1. The legal definition of an endowment fund is an institutional fund or part
thereof, not expendable by the institution on a current basis under the terms of the
applicable gift investment. NAT’L CONF. ON COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF.
PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(2) (2006) [hereinafter UPMIFA].
However, the word “endowment” generally is used in a broader sense than just the
permanent corpus of the fund. Quasi-endowment is a term that describes unrestricted
capital gifts that the charitable institution has decided to treat as endowment.
Endowment funds are contrasted to other types of funds, such as tuition revenues,
which are held for a very short term and are likely to be invested in treasury bills or
commercial paper. Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College,
University, Foundation Decisions on Annual Spending from Endowments: A Visit to the
World of Spending Rules, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 51 n.4 (1993).
Accounting classifications of endowments differ. Permanent or classic endowment
funds are restricted in their purposes by donors to provide long term funding for
designated purposes. Endowments of Not-for-Profit Organizations: Net Asset
Classification of Funds Subject to an Enacted Version of the Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act, and Enhanced Disclosures for All Endowment
Funds, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2008). Unrestricted net assets are not subject to donor-imposed restrictions. Id.
Temporarily restricted net assets consist of donor-restricted endowment funds that are
not classified as permanently restricted net assets. Id. When donor restrictions expire–a
stipulated time restriction ends or a purpose restriction is fulfilled–temporarily
restricted net assets are reclassified to unrestricted net assets and reported as net assets
released from restrictions. Id. The restrictive spending policies of UPMIFA would
apply only to true endowments with restrictions. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 2(2). All
types of endowment categories are commingled for investment purposes and are
referred to as “endowment.” Id. At Harvard in the fiscal year 2013, 64.7% of the
endowment is classified for accounting purposes as temporarily restricted; 18.1% as
permanently restricted; and 17.1% as unrestricted. HARVARD UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL
REPORT
FISCAL
2013
18
(2013),
available
at
http://vpfweb.harvard.edu/annualfinancial /pdfs/2013fullreport.pdf. Yale’s figures in the fiscal
year 2013 were 69.8% temporarily restricted; 15.2% permanently restricted; and 14.9%
unrestricted. YALE FINANCIAL REPORT 2012-2013 15 (2013), available at
www.yale.edu/finance /controller/reporting/reports.html.
2. Private foundations are charities that have failed certain tests of public support
under I.R.C. § 509 (2012). For the 2009 tax year, 92,624 domestic private foundations
reported $585.5 billion in total assets. Cynthia Belmonte, Domestic Private
Foundations and Related Excise Taxes, Tax Year 2009, STAT. OF INCOME BULL.,
Winter 2013, at 115 Fig. A. Private foundations typically are funded through a gift of
assets that becomes an endowment, and grants are paid out of the earnings generated.
I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1) requires private foundations to spend at least 5% of their current
investment asset value for charitable purposes. I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1) (2012).
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operations through the return received from the investment of this capital.
This article examines the legal framework for endowment investing,
endowment investing policies, their evolution to more sophisticated and
riskier strategies, and the consequences evinced during the financial crisis
of 2008 and beyond. It does not deal, save tangentially, with issues of
endowment spending policies, which have been matters of widespread
commentary and disagreement.3
The article suggests procedures and policies to encourage college and
university board practices that may better inform trustees of investment
approaches and, in some cases, restrain investment strategies that increase
the volatility of endowment returns. It is recommended that endowments
invest with more awareness and consider more realistically the possibility
of volatile negative returns, and their impact on the college or university,
its beneficiaries, and the communities it affects.
I. AN OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE OF ENDOWMENTS
The world of endowments is highly stratified in terms of size, utilization
of modern theories of finance, trustee governance procedures, and
delegation to and reliance on outside experts. The endowments discussed
herein have been artificially divided into two categories. First are the
largest and most sophisticated endowments, those with assets over $1
billion, which utilize the most modern tools of finance.4 Second are

3. See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 96-109 (2010); RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, § 18.5 (7th ed. 2007); Evelyn Brody,
Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687,
725 (1999); Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997); Peter Conti-Brown, Scarcity Amidst Wealth:
The Law, Finance, and Culture of Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis, 63
STAN. L. REV. 699, 741–43 (2011); Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have
Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUDIES 3, 40 (1990); Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming
Showdown Over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
1795 (2009); Daniel Halperin, Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?, 67 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 17 (2011); Daniel Halperin, Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?
(Part II), 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 125 (2011); Calvin H. Johnson, Payout by
Charities Over 50 Years, 132 TAX NOTES 1161 (Sept. 12, 2011); Akash Deep and Peter
Frumkin, The Foundation Payout Puzzle (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working
Paper No. 9, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com /abstract=301826. From the political
world, Senator Charles Grassley has weighed in by supporting a 5 % mandatory payout
of educational endowments to reduce the high costs of tuition and improve access to
the middle class and poor. See Karen W. Arenson, Big Spender, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20,
2008),
http:
//query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02EED91E3DF933A15757C0A96E9C8
B63&ref=karenwarenson.
4. In 2007, there were seventy-six endowments with $1 billion in assets and
sixty-five endowments with assets from $500 million to $999,999,999. NAT. ASS’N OF
COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2007 NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF
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endowments with assets from $500 million to $1 billion that have adopted
modern portfolio theories of investing, but generally may not have taken on
the same level of risk in their investment strategies, nor have they had
access to the most successful hedge funds, private equity firms, or
investment advisors, or garnered the gains or suffered the losses of the
largest endowments.
Intergenerational equity is the most commonly stated goal for
endowment management. As stated by James Tobin: “The trustees of an
endowment institution are the guardians of the future against the claims of
the present. Their task is to preserve equity among generations.” 5 This
means that tomorrow’s students, scientists, patients, beneficiaries, or
parishioners will receive the same or greater benefits, taking into account
the effects of inflation, as today’s beneficiaries. Another common rationale
for endowments is that they enable organizations to smooth out revenue
shortfalls, so that they can maintain the same scale of activities in lean
years as in bountiful ones. 6
The financial crisis of 2008 called into question both rationales. Colleges
and universities did not increase their spending rates to smooth out the
endowment spending shortfalls, and budget cutbacks were so severe at
many educational institutions that intergenerational equity for current
students or beneficiaries was not maintained. 7
It is difficult to find hard figures of the size of endowment funds in the

ENDOWMENTS (2007) [hereinafter 2007 NCSE]. In 2009, there were only fifty-six
endowments with $1 billion in assets and sixty-five endowments with assets from $500
million to $999,999,999. NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2009
NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NCSE]. In
2012, seventy-one endowments had $1 billion in assets, and seventy-three had assets
from $500 million to $999,999,999. NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS,
20012 NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2012) [hereinafter 2012
NCSE]. These figures include Canadian institutions. NACUBO-Commonfund figures
often differ from an institution’s own report of endowment results.
5. James Tobin, What is Permanent Endowment Income?, 64 AMER. ECON. REV.
427 (1974). Professor Tobin was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in
1981.
6. Robert C. Merton, Optimal Investment Strategies for University Endowment
Funds, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION 211, 211–12
(Charles T. Cotfelter & Michael Rothschild eds. 1993); Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at
708–09. Another view, offered by Professor Henry Hansmann, is that justifications of
intergenerational equity are not persuasive and may not call for a transfer of wealth
through saving from the present generation to spend on later ones. The argument for
endowment accumulation should be on grounds of efficiency. Professor Hansmann
suggests that the more compelling reasons for endowments are serving as a financial
buffer against periods of financial adversity; helping to assure long term survival of an
institution’s reputational capital; protecting intellectual freedom; and transmitting
prized values. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 14, 39.
7. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 702–03.
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United States, but the sum is immense. 8 In the period from 2001 to 2007,
higher education endowments grew annually by double digit figures led by
Harvard’s endowment, which ballooned from a little over $5 billion in
1993 to $36.6 billion at the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008. Yale’s
endowment grew from $3.1 billion to $22.9 billion in that period.
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, higher education endowments
lost three percent of their value in a difficult financial environment. Then
the bottom dropped out. The nation’s most severe financial crisis since the
Great Depression occurred in fall 2008. 9 This event wreaked havoc on
endowment portfolios. By the end of the 2009 fiscal year, Harvard’s
endowment was $25.7 billion (down 36.6% from the previous year),
followed by Yale’s at $16.3 billion (down 28.6%), and Stanford’s at $12.6
billion (down 26.7%). 10 A survey of over 800 higher education institutions
showed losses on average of 18.7%, the worst rate of return since the Great
Depression. 11
Colleges and universities with the largest endowments (over $1 billion)
lost more on average (20.5%) than smaller ones because of their
concentration in sophisticated investment strategies—so called alternative
assets—such as private equity and venture capital investments, 12 real estate,
and commodities, which involved more short-term risk and were illiquid.13
8. The 2012 NCSE for the 2012 fiscal year ending June 30 found that 831
institutions consisting of 525 private colleges and university endowments in addition to
306 public education institutional endowments had $406.1 billion in assets. 2012
NCSE, supra note 4. These figures are only part of the total. Figures for endowment
results are from the NCSE Report for the particular year mentioned.
9. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT XV (Jan. 2011).
10. Tamar Lewin, Investment Losses Cause Steep Dip in University Endowments,
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/201
0/01/28/education/28endow.h tml?_r=0. Although the declines were the greatest since
the Depression, those endowments had only fallen to their 2005 levels, and they had
positive returns over the ten years ending on June 30, 2009.
11. Kenneth E. Redd, To Ensure We Endure, BUSINESS OFFICER, July/August
2012, available at http://www.nacubo.org/Business_Officer_Magazine/Magazine_
Archives/JulyAugust_2012/To_Ensure_We_Endure.html.
12. Private equity consists of investments in companies, which may be held long
term as the firms add value or leveraged buyouts of public companies. Venture capital
involves an investment in a start-up company, which if it issues an initial public
offering of securities will generate a substantial profit to investors. For example, the
Yale endowment’s $300,000 investment in Google produced $75 million in gains when
the company went public in 2004. THE YALE ENDOWMENT 2010 19 (2010) [hereinafter
ENDOWMENT
REPORT
2010],
available
at
http://www.
YALE
yale.edu/investments/Yale_Endowment_10.pdf. Investments in private equity or
venture capital are typically structured as partnerships with hedge funds.
13. Despite the great recession, large endowments had better returns than
benchmark results such as the Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) 500 and smaller
endowments. In 2008, the S&P 500 declined 38.5%, the most since a 38.6%decline in
1937. Elizabeth Stanton, U.S. Stocks Post Steepest Yearly Decline Since Great
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Endowments of foundations, healthcare, social service, and cultural
institutions were similarly affected. 14 Endowment performance recovered
in the fiscal years 2010 and 2011, faltered in 2012, and rose in 2013.15
However, the levels of 2007 have not been reached.
Large endowment institutions often fund thirty-five percent or more of

Depression,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
31,
2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=a5RkfQG30k
1k.
Yale’s ten-year return from 2002 to 2012 was 10.6% per annum, adding $8.89 billion
to the endowment, including the disastrous decline in 2008. Its twenty year return was
13.7% per annum adding $15.8 billion in value. THE YALE ENDOWMENT 2012 32
available at
(2012) [hereinafter YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2012],
http://investments.yale.edu/images/documents/Yale_Endow ment_12.pdf. Harvard’s
endowment averaged 9.49% over ten years and 12.29% over twenty years. JANE L.
MENDILLO, HARVARD MANAGEMENT COMPANY ENDOWMENT REPORT, MESSAGE FROM
THE
CEO
(2012),
available
at
http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/docs/
Final_Annual_Report_201 2.pdf.
The average ten-year return in 2012 for all educational endowments net of fees
was 6.2%. 2012 NCSE, supra note 4, at 3. The average ten-year return for all
endowments in 2009 was 4%. Goldie Blumenstyk, Average Return on Endowment
Investments Is Worst in Almost 40 Years, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan 28, 2010),
http://chronicle.com/article/Average-Return-on-Endowment/63762/. For the fiscal year
2009, the five largest university endowments declined by 25% to 30%. Craig Karmin,
Ivy League Endowments Finally ‘Dumb’, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB12463183415797 0855. According to a survey
by the Northern Trust Corp, the median loss of endowments with less than $100
million in assets that same year was 16%. Id. Presumably smaller endowments had a
more traditional asset allocation, including more old fashioned fixed income. Id.
14. An annual survey by the Chronicle of Philanthropy of 221 private foundations
and sixty-nine community foundations found that endowments dropped by 26% in the
calendar year 2008. Caroline Preston, Foundation Endowments Dipped in 2008, but
PHILANTHROPY
(July
2,
2009),
Giving
Rose,
CHRON.
http://philanthropy.com/article/Foundation-Endowments-Dipped/6311 7/.
15. In the fiscal year 2012, the average investment return of educational
endowments was 0.3% compared to 19.2% in the fiscal year 2011, 11.9% in 2010, and
18.7% in 2009. See 2009 NCSE, supra note 4; NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS.
OFFICERS, 2010 NACUBO-COMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2009) [hereinafter
2010 NCSE]; NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2011 NACUBOCOMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS(2011) [hereinafter 2011 NCSE]; 2012 NCSE
supra note 4; Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Coll. and Univ. Bus. Officers, Educational
Endowments Returned an Average of -.3% in FY 2012, Down Sharply from 19.2% in
available at http://www.nacubo.org/Research/
FY2011 (Feb. 1, 2013),
NACUBO_Endowment_Study.html. Preliminary data from the NACUBOCommonfund survey for the fiscal year 2013 indicates that investment returns for all
college and university endowments averaged 11.7% due to the strength of the equity
markets. Endowments with assets over $1 billion posted an average investment return
of 11.6%, and endowments with assets between $501 million to $1 billion had average
returns of 12.9% due to greater allocation to equities compared to alternative
investments. Press Release, Nat’t Ass’n of Coll. and Univ. Bus. Officers, Preliminary
Data Indicate Educational Endowments Earned Investment Returns Averaging 11.7%
(Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/
2013NCSEPreliminaryPressRelease.pdf.
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their operating budget through the endowment’s payout.16 In response to
the asset declines of 2008, colleges, universities, museums, and other
charities froze or delayed construction and expansion projects, cut
operating budgets, drew on cash reserves, implemented hiring and salary
freezes, and ordered layoffs. 17 A few sued their financial advisors. 18 Many
colleges and universities struggled to preserve financial aid. Several
institutions, including Harvard, issued bonds to raise money for expenses
or to allow them to hold on to illiquid assets until their price rose.19 Rating
services cut university credit ratings. On top of this, charitable giving in
education and elsewhere declined as a result of the financial crisis.20 This
following discussion explores what went wrong and why it may occur
again.
16. See MENDILLO, supra note 13, at 3; HARVARD UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL
REPORT FISCAL 2013, supra note 1, at 6 (35% budget); YALE ENDOWMENT 2010, supra
note 12 (41.3% budget); YALE ENDOWMENT 2012, supra note 12, at 4 (36% budget).
The most common measure of endowments is their dollar asset value. There are other
measures such as endowment to expense ratios and endowment per full-time enrolled
student. The endowment-to-expense ratio acknowledges that the strength of an
endowment depends on the extent to which it can pay for institutional activities. Sarah
Waldeck believes the endowment-to-expense ratio is the most sophisticated measure
available to policymakers because it compares the endowment to an institution’s actual
costs and acknowledges that some schools are more expensive to operate than others.
The endowment per full-time enrolled student also recognizes that some schools are
more expensive to run than others but instead of using actual costs, the measure relies
on the number of full-time students as a rough proxy for institutional expenses. See
Waldeck, supra note 3, at 1799–1802.
17. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at Appendix B for an elaboration of the
layoffs and cutbacks by the institutions with the five largest endowments. For the
impact on the six Boston area institutions, see Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus
Institute, Educational Endowments and the Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic
Risks in the Shadow Banking System 55–56 (2011), [hereinafter Tellus Report],
available at http://www.tellus.org/publications/files/endowmentcrisis. pdf.
18. Conti-Brown, supra note 3.
19. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 37–38.
20. Charitable contributions to higher education declined 57% on an inflation
adjusted basis in 2008 compared to the previous year, the largest percentage drop in
fifty years, and in the fiscal year 2009, giving to colleges dropped 11.9%. Kathryn
Masterson, Private Giving to Colleges Dropped Sharply in 2009, THE CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Feb, 3, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Private-Giving-to-Colleges/63879/;
Stephanie Strom, Charitable Giving Declines, a New Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2009, at A16; Matthew Kaminski, The Age of Diminishing Endowments, WALL ST.
J., June 6-7, 2009, at A11; In fiscal year 2010, giving to colleges and universities
increased 0.5%, but on an inflation adjusted basis decline 0.6%. Press Release, Council
for Aid to Educ., Colleges and Universities Raise 28 Billion in 2010, Same Total as
2006 (Feb. 2, 2011). According to the Voluntary Support of Education Survey,
conducted by the Council for Aid to Education (CAE), charitable contributions to
American colleges and universities increased 2.3% in 2012 to $31 billion, but the total
is still below 2008’s historical high of $31.6 billion. Press Release, CAE, Colleges and
Universities Raise $31 Billion in 2012 (Feb. 20, 2013).Adjusting for inflation, giving is
virtually unchanged, inching up just 0.2%. Id.
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II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO ENDOWMENT INVESTING
Initially, endowments were gifts of property given to institutions to
provide them with a source of dependable income from rents or interest. 21
Growth was achieved primarily through additional gifts, and endowment
funds were invested quite conservatively. English law encouraged this
approach. There were legal lists of securities, principally governmental
securities, which were presumably safe investments in which trustees could
invest. 22
In 1830, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the
English rule because there were few government securities available, and
they were not necessarily safe.23 The court then enunciated the prudent
person rule:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is
to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital
to be invested. 24
The court concluded that the trustees acted according to their best skill
and discretion. 25 The prudent person rule meant that no security per se was

21. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 17.
22. BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT
MAN RULE 11 (1986).
23. Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830). In Amory, the trustees of
Harvard College were directed by the terms of a $50,000 testamentary trust of John
M’Lean to “loan the same upon ample and sufficient security or to invest the same in
safe and productive stock either in the public funds, bank shares of other stock,
according to their best judgment and discretion” paying the income to the testator’s
wife for her lifetime and thereafter to deliver the principal to Harvard College and
Massachusetts General Hospital in equal shares to be held by them and used to further
their charitable purposes. Id.
The trustees invested in several bank and insurance stocks as well as those of two
manufacturing companies which declined in value. Id. The two charitable
remaindermen, Harvard and Mass. General, sought to surcharge the trustees for the
reduction in value of the insurance and manufacturing stocks which had declined from
$41,000 to $29,000, on the ground that they were not proper trust investments. Id. This
was the English rule at the time. Justice Putnam, who delivered the opinion of the
court, rejected the reasoning behind the English rule as having “very little or no
application” to American trust law because American government securities were both
exceedingly limited in amount compared to the amount of trust funds to be invested
and in any event not necessarily a safe investment. Id. at 460. Additionally, investments
in private corporations were subject to suit by law whereas the government could only
be supplicated. Id. at 461.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 463.
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inappropriate, but the rule was interpreted restrictively. Some jurisdictions
continued the “legal list” approach. 26
Endowment managers spent quite conservatively. The “income” (e.g.,
dividends, interest, rent, and royalties) generated by an endowment could
be currently expended, but the principal of the fund remained inviolate.27 In
the nineteenth century, trustees invested in fixed-income securities, such as
Treasury notes and secured corporate bonds while maintaining up to one
third of their portfolios in real estate and mortgages. 28 Investment practices
changed at some institutions after the First World War. In the 1920s, as the
stock market rose, many endowments invested in high yielding bonds and
common stocks. The experience of the Yale endowment is illustrative.
During the 1920s, the Yale endowment invested over one half of its assets
in equities. 29 In 1930, equities represented forty-two percent of the Yale
endowment portfolio, whereas the average college or university had only
eleven percent. 30
The Great Depression led to a more sober approach. In the late 1930s,
Yale’s treasurer decided the share of equities in Yale’s portfolio should be
reduced. 31 He introduced an investing template that lasted three decades: at
least two dollars would be held in fixed income instruments for every

26. See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869) (prohibiting investment in stocks). The
prudent person rule was interpreted conservatively because courts tended to look at
investment decisions on the basis of hindsight. If an investment decision turned out
badly, courts often concluded that the original decision was bad. In re Chamberlain’s
Estate, 156 A. 42 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931) is an example. A testator died in August 1929,
two months before the market crash that ushered in the Great Depression. Between his
death and the court hearing on the estate, the estate’s value had declined from $258,000
to less than $200,000. The bulk of its corpus was in securities listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. With breathtaking hindsight clarity, the court stated:
It was common knowledge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies,
but the general public as well, that the stock market condition was an
unhealthy one, that values were very much inflated, and that a crash was
almost sure to occur. In view of this fact, I think it was the duty of the
executors to dispose of these stocks immediately upon their qualifications as
executors. The loss to the estate resulting from their failure to act should be
taken into consideration now in awarding them compensation for their
services.
Id. at 43. The trustees escaped a surcharge only because the will authorized the
executors to retain the stocks. For further discussion of this case, see Philip J. Ruse,
The Trustee and the Prudent Investor: The Emerging Acceptance of Alternative
Investments as the New Fiduciary Standard, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 653, 663 (2012).
27. Dobris, supra note 1, at 54–55.
28. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 18.
29. JOSH LERNER, YALE UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS OFFICE: AUGUST 2006 2
(2011).
30. Id.
31. Id.

208

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 40, No. 2

dollar in equity. 32 This may have served Yale well in the 1930s and 1940s
but was unsuited in the post-World War II bull markets of the 1950s and
1960s. Yale then substantially increased its exposure to equity investments,
as did other colleges and universities.33
A catalyst for this change was a task force report sponsored by the Ford
Foundation that concluded that most college and university endowments
were too conservative in their investment policies. 34 The changes in
endowment asset allocation did not result from a serendipitous recognition
by endowment managers who had read the work of financial economists
and had concluded equities over time were a sounder investment than
bonds. There were external pressures on colleges and universities and other
nonprofits.
A. Total Return Investing
Commencing in the late 1960s and 1970s, nonprofits faced inflation,
government cutbacks in support, limitations on tuition increases at
educational organizations, and in some sectors of education, a decline in
demand. These developments abetted new endowment investment
strategies, 35 one of which was more liberal spending policies through what
was termed “total return policies,” which permitted the expenditure of
capital gains as well as traditional investment income. 36 Total return
investing allowed charities with endowments to spend more for current
needs, and they became increasingly dependent on endowment returns for
the annual budget.
Total return investing encouraged endowment trustees to downplay
conservative investment strategies in favor of maximizing endowment
growth. Institutions whose endowments had been wholly invested in bonds

32. Id. At this time, the treasurer and trustees managed the endowment
themselves, selecting individual bonds and high yield stocks for the portfolio. Id.
33. Id.
34. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT, MANAGING
EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS: REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1969). The legal
impetus for the change in philosophy of investing and spending policies was another
Ford Foundation sponsored report. WILLIAM E. CARY & CRAIG BRIGHT, THE LAW AND
LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS (1969).
35. Henry Hansmann, supra note 3, at 3, 10. Though gifts remained a significant
aspect to endowment growth, particularly for smaller endowments, new approaches to
investing provided the engine for growth. See FRED ROGERS, SOURCES OF ENDOWMENT
GROWTH AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 4 (2005), available at
https://www.commonfund.org/InvestorResources/Publications/
White%20Papers/Sources%20of%20Endowment%20Growth.pdf.
36. LONGSTRETH, supra note 22, at 24–25. A portfolio managed under a totalreturn policy perspective will consider the realized and unrealized gain/loss as part of
the portfolio’s performance, in addition to the yield. The total-return endowment
investor can achieve greater returns than that of a buy-and-hold endowment.
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or preferred stock, offering a reliable income stream, diversified their
portfolios by allocating more to domestic and international equities and a
wide range of alternative investments.37 Concurrently, there arose an
increasing use of external professional investment managers who had been
converted to the principles of Modern Portfolio Theory (“MPT”), which
provided the intellectual foundation for a new aggressive approach to
endowment management. 38
B. Modern Portfolio Theory
Beyond framing the prudent person rule, Justice Putnam in Harvard
College v. Amory also offered some timeless investment advice: “Do what
you will, the capital is at hazard.” 39 Unless an endowment is wholly
invested in risk-free assets, such as United States Government Treasuries,
that admonition remains true. All investments and investment strategies
carry with them some risk in a sense of possible loss of real inflation
adjusted value. 40 Modern Portfolio Theory provides a framework for
managing an endowment’s risk through the diversification of the portfolio.
No longer is the focus of risk tied to the selection of individual securities.
Modern investment management examines the portfolio as a whole, rather
than any given type of asset or a decision concerning that asset.
In common parlance, risk is the chance of loss. In finance, risk refers to
volatility of return.41 A fundamental responsibility of an endowment board
member or investment advisor is to manage the risk of the endowment’s
portfolio in relation to the objectives of the fund. When an endowment’s
board and its outside investment managers contend with risk, careful
37. According to the 2012 NCSE study of 831 colleges and university
endowments in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2012, the average allocation for survey
participants was: 15% in U.S. stocks, 11% in fixed income, 16% in international
equities, 4% in cash or short term securities, and 53% in alternative investments. 2012
NCSE, supra note 4, at 5. For endowments of $1 billion or more, the figures were 12%
in domestic equities, 9% in fixed income, 16% in international equities, 3% in cash,
and 54% in alternative investments. Id.
38. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 19.
39. Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 468 (1830).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (1) (1992).
41. Financial economists use risk to describe variation when the probabilities of
possible outcomes are known. Professor Lynn Stout differentiates risk from uncertainty
with the following example: a coin toss is risky but not uncertain. The probability of a
coin coming up heads or tails is 50%. Returns on securities, however, are both risky
and uncertain. No one knows with certainty whether securities prices will go up or
down or the probability of the event. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 641 n.30 (2003).
Volatility can be measured statistically by standard deviations, which indicate the
degree to which an investment has varied in the course of arriving at its mean return
over a given period. Investments with the greatest volatility have the highest standard
deviation and should offer the greatest return.
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attention must be given to the organization’s tolerance for volatility.
Several types of risk need be considered, including nonmarket diversifiable
risk and market risk. 42
Nonmarket diversifiable risk, also known as firm or specific risk, relates
to the risk of a particular firm or industry. One of the central findings of
MPT is there are large and essentially costless gains to diversifying a
portfolio. 43 Firm or industry risk can be minimized or reduced though
holding a diversified portfolio of securities. 44 For example, if new car sales
drop in a recession and companies that operate auto repair franchises thrive
at such times and have equivalent risk and return characteristics, a portfolio
with both types of companies will be less risky than if the endowment
contains only equities of one type.
A diversified portfolio may contain securities across many asset classes
or hold many different issuers within a particular asset class or industry. No
one compensates an investor who fails to diversify so as to minimize risk.
In other words, an investor cannot demand a higher return from holding a
risky security if he or she could have diversified. The proverb that
admonishes “don’t put all of your eggs in one basket,” neatly sums up
diversifiable risk. 45 Diversification moderates risks that are inherent in

42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (1) (1992).
43. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 647 (1996).
44. Professor Stout offers this example: when fuel prices rise, airline stocks fall
while the price of oil stocks rise. Stout, supra note 41, at 641, n.30. Investors can
eliminate industry-specific risk by having a diversified portfolio of securities covering
several industries. Id. The benefit of diversification of investments is far from a new
idea. In The Merchant of Venice, Antonio speaks of it:
I thank my fortune for it,
My ventures are not in one bottom trusted
Nor to one place;
Nor is my whole estate
Upon the fortune of this present year;
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 1.
45. The phrase is very old, and its origin is unknown. In 1666, Giovanni Torriano,
in the Second Alphabet of Proverbial Phrases, stated: “To put all ones eggs in a panier,
viz. to hazard all in one bottom [ship].” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 91 (2d ed.
1991). Professor John Langbein offers a more contemporary example:
[T]he investor who buys bonds issued by weaker issuers (so called junk
bonds) assumes greater risk of default than the investor who only buys
Treasuries. The junk bonds pay higher interest rates, compensating the
investor for bearing the greater risk. But no one pays the investor for
concentrating a portfolio in too small a range of asset classes or issuers. Thus,
under diversification causes the portfolio to bear uncompensated risk, risk that
could be largely eliminated by spreading the investments across a wider range
of asset classes and issues.
John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to
Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2010). A recent example of the costs that
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investing and reduces risks that are not justified by the prospect of gain. A
fiduciary has the responsibility of reducing or minimizing risk that can be
avoided. 46
Another type of risk affects all securities, that is, the securities markets
as a whole. A recession, a downgrade of sovereign debt, a world war, or an
event such as 9/11 are examples of market risk, also called systemic or
systematic risk. Market risk is non-diversifiable since it is common to all
securities. 47 With non-diversifiable risk, the investor must be compensated
for assuming greater risk by obtaining a higher expected return. Thus, there
is a positive correlation between risk and expected return.48 MPT was an
incentive to increase portfolio risk because of the lure of greater returns
that would result.
MPT assumes that investors have two desires: they seek higher returns
and want those expected returns to be stable and certain. Because investors
prefer certainty, higher risk investments must offer higher expected returns
than lower risk investments. An investor need not avoid high risk
investments because she can reduce risk by investing in securities of
similar risks, which are not correlated to each other—e.g. automobile

failure to diversify may lead to involves the Cowboys Athletic Endowment of
Oklahoma State University (“OSU”), which received a $165 million donation from oil
man Boone Pickens to transform OSU’s athletics. The endowment invested all of its
assets in Pickens’ hedge fund, BP Capital, as well as in an insurance program where it
purchased life insurance policies on older OSU alumni. The hedge fund lost most of its
value, and OSU alumni declined to die in timely fashion. The endowment, which once
had assets of $400 million, declined to $125 million. See Ann Zimmerman, Boone
Calls the Plays as Largess Complicates Life at Alma Mater, WALL ST. J. July 7, 2012,
at A1. This is not only an American problem. Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan lost
$230 million from an investment in a derivative product called a “power-reverse dual
currency bond” that was marketed to nonprofit investors. See Hideyuki Sano, Japan’s
Temples, Universities, Hospital’s Haunted by Yen Bets, REUTERS (Jul. 23, 2013),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-japan-derivatives-idUKBRE96L0WI20130
722.
46. UPMIFA, supra note 1 § 4(e)(4); NAT’L CONF. ON COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE
LAWS, UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 (1994) [hereinafter UPIA].
47. Langbein, supra note 43, at 648.
48. Expected return is a measure of return that uses the concept of probability to
take into account the volatility or uncertainty of outcomes. It is the arithmetic mean of
all possible outcomes. An example is you flip a coin, there is a 50% chance of heads
and a 50% chance of tails. If you wager one dollar on the flip, you will gain two dollars
if you win and nothing if you lose, and the expected return is one dollar. This is
determined by multiplying the probability of each possible outcome: .5 X $2 + .5 X 0 =
$1.00. WILLIAM KLEIN, JOHN C. COFFEE & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE 242 (11th ed. 2011). This approach, the mean variance portfolio selection
model, was developed by Harry Markowitz and posits that returns can be estimated by
the historical mean of an asset’s returns, and risk could be quantified by the historical
volatility of the returns, the variance. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77
(1952).
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manufacturers and auto repair chains of equivalent risk. 49 The higher the
market or systemic risk an investor accepts, the higher the rate of return
should accompany the increased risk. If two assets give the same expected
return, the rational investor should always select the asset with the lower
risk. Correspondingly, if two assets returns have equivalent risks, the
rational investor should always select the asset with the higher expected
return.
By diversifying risk throughout a portfolio, investors can achieve greater
portfolio returns without taking greater overall portfolio risks. 50 A portfolio
that offers the highest returns with the least variance is termed efficient.51
Individuals and institutions have differing appetites for risk. Each efficient
portfolio has the highest level of return for an acceptable level of risk.
Rational investors select the portfolio that best serves their taste for
aggressive objectives or a defensive (conservative) strategy. 52 They can
combine high risk investments with risk-free ones to lower a portfolio’s
overall risk. The development of the Black-Scholes Options pricing model
in 1973 further enabled investment managers to quantify risk through
valuing the price of options based on five variables. 53 This permitted
investment managers to purchase or sell options to hedge portfolio risk. 54
49. Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern
Prudent Investor Doctrine, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 858 (2010).
50. A measure of a security’s volatility of return relative to the market as a whole
is called the beta. The market as a whole has a beta of one. A beta can be derived for
individual securities. The individual beta compares its volatility to that of the market
beta. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) provides a formula for measuring
expected returns on any given investment at a particular measure of risk related to the
return. CAPM states that the expected risk premium on each investment is proportional
to its beta. In a competitive market, the expected risk premium varies in direct
proportion to the market beta. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN
ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 189 (10th ed. 2011). CAPM allows
investors to assess whether they have achieved an appropriate level of return for the
risk they’ve assumed. STEVE LYDENBERG, MARKETS AT RISK: THE LIMITS OF MODERN
PORTFOLIO THEORY 42 (2009), available at www.domini.com/common/pdf/Marketsat-Risk.pdf.
51. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 192–93.
52. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
257 (1996). Optimal portfolios are achieved by examining the historical mean volatility
of an asset and its correlation to other asset. If the stock market declines, an optimally
diversified portfolio will consist of asset classes that will rise in such situations.
53. The variables are the current market price of the underlying stock, the
exercise price of the option, the continuously compounded risk free rate of return
expressed on an annual basis, the time remaining before expiration of the option, and
the volatility of the underlying stock. WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE
192–3 (7th ed. 2012). The Black-Scholes Pricing Model enabled any derivative
security to be priced. Id.
54. Douglas O. Edwards, An Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk
Management Incentives After the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
247, 264–65 (2010).
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The second prong of MPT is the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
(“EMH”). In 1953, an English statistician, Maurice Kendall, presented a
paper to the Royal Statistical Society on the behavior of stock and
commodity prices.55 Kendall had expected to find regular price cycles, but
to his surprise, they did not exist. 56 Each price change of a security seemed
to wander, as if a coin was tossed. 57 In other words, price changes followed
a random walk.
This means that today’s price change of a stock gives investors almost
no clue as to the change of a stock’s price tomorrow. This does not suggest
that the determinants of price changes are random, but they are determined
by flows of relevant new information that arise, unrelated to past price
movements. 58 If past price changes could predict future price changes,
investors could make easy profits, but in a competitive market such profits
don’t last. When investors try to take advantage of the information in past
prices of a security, its price adjusts immediately. As a result, all the
information in past prices is reflected in today’s stock price, not
tomorrow’s. 59
EMH assumes that that in an efficient stock market, the prices of
securities reflect all available information. Therefore, securities are
appropriately or efficiently priced. 60 This means prices of securities reflect
55. Maurice G. Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time-Series-Part I. Prices,
117 J. OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC’Y 11 (1953).
56. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 314.
57. Id. at 314–16. Remember, the odds of heads or tails on any coin flip is always
50%. Stout, supra note 41, at 646.
58. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 413–14 (1970). Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991). Professor Fama was awarded the 2013 Nobel Prize
for Economic Science. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
59. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 317. In the real world there are
thousands of investment analysts and millions of investors. Why would so much money
be spent on trying to discover information which will yield profits when EMH posits
one cannot consistently beat the market? The EMH was modified in two ways: the
market price reflects the informational level of the best informed trader, and market
efficiency is a matter of degree. Prices reflect the value of the firm, only if all traders
have full information. BRATTON, supra note 53, at 24. When prices get out of line,
arbitrageurs and rational investors will swoop in and make costless profits which will
bring securities prices back into line. Sanford J. Grossman & George E. Stiglitz, On the
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
60. Lydenberg, supra note 50, at 43. There are several claims about the efficiency
of prices. The more modest is that prices react quickly to new information but do not
necessarily relate to the intrinsic value of the firm. Prices under this view are
informationally or speculatively efficient, which means that investors cannot acquire
information to make advantageous purchases or sales before the information is
reflected in the security’s price. A stronger claim asserts that market prices react and
reflect the intrinsic value of the firm. This second type of efficiency is termed “intrinsic
value” or “allocative efficiency.” BRATTON, supra note 53, at 23.
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accurately the expected risk and return of those securities because
securities prices incorporate the best available information about those
securities. 61
The heart of the EMH was that the market was rational and pervasive
market forces invariably pushed securities’ prices toward their correct,
fundamental values.62 Two conclusions follow: 1) if the EMH is correct, an
individual investor or firm cannot develop an investing or trading strategy
that consistently beats the market because the market price already reflects
the information on which the investor acts; and 2) no investment is a per se
bad investment because the investment’s price already factors in the
investment’s risk. 63 Although endowments commenced investing in
common stocks and reaped the benefits of bull markets, it was not until the
development of MPT in the mid-1970s that, from a theoretical perspective,
equities were considered a more stable investment than bonds.
III. THE NEW ENDOWMENT MODEL OF INVESTING
The core principles of MPT—that the correlation between risk and
return can bring greater returns and additional risk can be managed through
diversification of investments—made endowment managers more risk
tolerant. Initially, portfolios shifted into equities in efficient domestic
markets. Then, they moved into other asset classes and markets, some
publicly traded, and others that were not. 64 Diversification became global.
Endowments increased their use of derivatives, financial instruments that
can hedge risk or be mere speculative wagers. 65

61. There is disagreement over whether prices in an efficient market are
“informationally efficient” or “allocatively efficient.” An informationally efficient
market responds quickly to new publicly available information. Robert M. Daines &
Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate
Law, 102 YALE L.J. 577, 615 (1992). An allocatively efficient market reflects the best
estimate of the present value of a firm’s future earnings, that is, its intrinsic value. Id.
62. JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET 192 (2009).
63. Sterk, supra note 49, at 860–61. The second conclusion means that the risk
intrinsic to any marketable security is presumptively already discounted into the current
price of the security. Langbein, supra note 43, at 649.
64. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 19. There are distinctions between traditional
asset classes—cash or cash equivalents, fixed income (bonds), publicly traded equities
(stocks)—and nontraditional or ‘alternative’ asset classes, such as private equity and
venture capital, hedge funds, and ‘real assets’ from commodities to real estate to
timber. Id. at 19. Within asset classes, diversification means broad exposure to
representative markets. Id.
65. Derivatives are agreements between parties that one will pay the other a sum
of money that is determined by whether or not a particular event will occur in the future
to some underlying financial asset, such as an asset price, interest rate, currency
exchange, or almost anything else. The value of the derivative is based on the value of
the underlying asset. Lynn A. Stout, The Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis (UCLA
Sch.
of
Law,
Law-Econ
Research
Paper,
2011),
available
at
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Beginning in the 1990s, larger endowments, primarily those with over
$1 billion in assets, undertook a new approach to portfolio management
called the “endowment model of investing.” This phrase describes a theory
and practice of investing characterized by a highly-diversified, long-term
portfolio that differs from a traditional stock/bond mix in that it includes
allocations to less-traditional and less-liquid asset categories, such as
private equity and real estate, as well as absolute return strategies. 66 These
are called alternative investments. Basically, an alternative investment is
one that is not cash, stocks, or bonds—the three traditional asset classes.
“Alternate investments” is a loose phrase comprising hard assets such as
minerals and timber to financial derivatives, real estate, venture capital, and
private equity. They are attractive to endowments because they usually
have a low correlation to traditional asset classes, which may boost overall
returns. They are less regulated, transparent, and liquid than traditional
asset classes, and they often have substantial minimum capital
requirements and charge high fees.
The endowment model of investing tries to find two or more related
assets mispriced relative to each other. Then by buying the cheap asset,
selling the expensive asset, and eliminating as much ancillary risk as
possible, the objective is to produce excess returns with little or no
correlation to the underlying market actions. The endowment might have
substantial long and short positions to capture the full potential of a small
mispricing. 67
Yale, Harvard, and other wealthy endowments became proponents of
this widespread shift into alternative, arcane, and illiquid investments,
which were in emerging, inefficient, and nontraditional markets. 68 The
justification for this approach is explained by one of the endowment
model’s most successful practitioners, David F. Swenson, Chief Investment
Officer of the Yale Endowment: “Alternative assets, by their very nature
tend to be less efficiently priced than traditional marketable securities,
http:ssrn.com/abstract=1770082.
66. JANE L. MENDILLO, HARVARD MANAGEMENT COMPANY ENDOWMENT
REPORT, MESSAGE FROM THE CEO 3 (Sept. 2010), available at
http://cdn.wds.harvard.edu/2010_endowment_report _09_09_2010.pdf. Absolute return
strategies include short selling, futures, derivatives, arbitrage, leverage (borrowing or
lending funds), and unconventional assets, similar to hedge funds. An absolute return
strategy attempts to provide positive returns independent from markets’ movements.
YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 10. Absolute strategies differ from
relative strategies in that the latter seek to top a benchmark, for example, the Dow
Jones Industrials.
67. ANDRÉ PEROLD & ERIK STAFFORD, HARVARD MANAGEMENT COMPANY 3
(2010).
68. In 1990 Yale had 75% of its endowment in domestic marketable securities.
YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 3. It shrank to 5.8% in 2012. Id.
The average endowment model investment in domestic equities is 15%. 2012 NCSE,
supra note 4, at 5.
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providing an opportunity to exploit market inefficiencies through active
management.” 69 However, these same alternative investments may offer
little transparency or liquidity, carry higher risks than traditional asset
classes, and may involve speculative trading strategies. 70 For many years,
the highest returns were earned by the largest endowments, which had
access to the most sophisticated money managers and the in-house
expertise to evaluate a complex mix of alternative investments.
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE NEW PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE
The promise of flexibility conveyed by the prudent person standard
failed in application because interpretations rendered by judges and
commentators were more receptive to the legal principle of stare decisis
than to the evolving economic principles that inform investment
management. 71 Trustees worried about their legal liabilities. Cary and
Bright’s 1969 study concluded that there was little developed law
restricting the power of trustees to invest endowment funds to achieve
growth, and the impediments to such freedom of action were more
legendary than real. 72 However, the lack of constraining legal precedent
was insufficient for institutional trustees to ignore prudence and the
conservatism inherent in trust law principles. 73 Modern portfolio
69. YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 9. Alternative investments
include hedge funds, which traditionally were pools of capital used to purchase
securities on both sides of a market risk. Today, the term connotes any lightly regulated
investment pool that engages in a wide range of investment strategies, some of which
are high-risk, which seek to generate superior long-term returns by exploiting market
inefficiencies. Alternative investments also include private equity, such as venture
capital and leveraged buyout funds, which take stakes in start-up businesses or buy
firms primarily with borrowed money in the hope of cashing out at a later time when
the firm is acquired by another company or goes public. The largest endowments also
achieve diversification by investing in real assets, such as real estate, oil and gas, and
timber.
70. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 20. Investors demand a premium for placing
assets in an illiquid investment. The illiquidity premium refers to the fact that the
investment cannot quickly be converted to cash. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 729.
In times of financial need or extreme stress in the markets, an illiquid investment
cannot be turned into cash except at a great loss or not at all. The advantage of illiquid
investments is that the holder does not have to pay a liquidity premium as part of the
price, thereby increasing the return on the investment. Those who may need cash in the
short term cannot commit to such long term investments. From a long term perspective,
this works well, but if any of the illiquid funds are needed in the present as they were in
2008 and cannot be obtained, the university will have to borrow or cut the budget or
both. Id. at 731–32.
71. See Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 466–68 (1830).
72. CARY & BRIGHT, supra note 34, at 60.
73. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr. Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement,
77 IOWA L. REV. 1151, 1153–54 (1992); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence
of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987); JAMES J. FISHMAN
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management demanded a new paradigm of prudence, which embraced
modern economic theory and received unquestioned legal approval. 74
Commencing in the late 1960s, several legislative and regulatory
initiatives departed from the traditional prudence standard in defining the
duties of fiduciaries of pension funds, endowments, and charities;
recognized the need for diversification; permitted delegation of
responsibility; and adopted modern portfolio theory. 75 In 1969, Congress
enacted a restrictive enforcement regime over private foundations, which
included a prohibition on jeopardy investments. 76 The Treasury regulations
interpreting that section of the Internal Revenue Code accepted the
principles of MPT and stated that in the exercise of the requisite standard of
care and prudence, “foundation managers may take into account . . . the
need for diversification within the investment portfolio.” 77 The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and its regulations
applicable to pension funds utilized the corporate standard of care and
prudence. 78 It also adopted MPT by mandating that a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties by “diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is
clearly prudent not to do so.” 79
Of particular importance to endowment managers was the adoption,
eventually in forty-eight states, of the Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act of 1972 (“UMIFA”), applicable to charitable organizations. 80
UMIFA clarified legal concerns by authorizing governing boards to invest
an endowment fund with the standards of care and prudence applicable to
corporate trustees. 81 It gave specific investment authority for governing
boards to invest in a wide range of personal and real property, 82 and it
clarified the right of nonprofits to delegate and to contract with independent
financial advisors. 83 The section dealing with the standard of care was
derived from the Treasury’s private foundation regulations dealing with
& STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 208 (4th
ed. 2010).
74. LONGSTRETH, supra note 22, at 152–57.
75. Id. at 4.
76. I.R.C. § 4944 (2012). See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 73, at 794–95,
for a simplified description of this complicated area of the law.
77. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i) (1973).
78. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C.§ 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012); see also LONGSTRETH, supra note 22, at 32–36.
79. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(C).
80. NAT’L CONF. ON COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS
ACT
§
2
(1972),
available
at
http://www.nacua.org/documents/umifa.pdf [hereinafter UMIFA].
81. Id. at § 2.
82. Id. at § 4.
83. Id. at § 5.
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investment responsibility of managers of private foundations. 84 UMIFA
required governing boards to exercise “ordinary business care and
prudence” under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the
action or decision. 85 Boards could consider the long and short term needs of
the institution in carrying out its exempt purposes, its present and
anticipated financial requirements, expected total return on its investments,
price level trends, and general economic conditions. 86 The UMIFA
comment to the section stated that the standard of care is comparable to the
business corporate director rather than that of a private trustee. 87
In the late 1980s and early 1990s came the drafting of uniform laws
relating to trusts and the third revision of the influential Restatement of
Trusts. 88 All adopted MPT and a new definition of prudent investment
management. The first part of the restatement project appeared in 1992
with the publication of a volume on the prudent person rule. 89 Section 227
presented the standard of prudent investment, and the general comment to
that section offered a detailed discussion of MPT as the foundation of
prudent investing. 90
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”), which has
been adopted in forty-four states. 91 UPIA regulates the investment
responsibilities of trustees of private and charitable trusts and explicitly
adopted the MPT, 92 as did the Uniform Trust Code approved in 1994,
which has been adopted in whole or part by twenty-five states. 93
A revision of the UMIFA commenced in 2006. It bootstrapped upon the
principles of the UPIA and was renamed the Uniform Prudent Management
84. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i) (1973).
85. UMIFA, supra note 80, at § 6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at § 5.
88. UPIA, supra note 46.
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT PERSON RULE § 227 (1992).
90. See id. at cmt.e (1)-p, renumbered as § 90 in 2007. Renumbered sections are
used hereinafter.
91. UPIA, supra note 46.
92. Id. at § 2b. The UPIA offers a template for the process of prudent investing:
(1) the standard of prudence is applied to any investment as part of a total portfolio
rather than to individual investments (2) the trade-off in all investing between risk and
return is a fiduciary’s central consideration; (3) there are no categorical restrictions on
types of investments; the trustee can invest in anything that plays an appropriate role in
achieving the risk/return objectives of prudent investing; (4) diversification of
investments is part of the definition of prudent investing; and (5) delegation of
investment and management functions is specifically permitted. Id. at § 2(9). See
generally Langbein, supra note 43.
93. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 cmt. (2010). The comment to this section states in
part: “This section is similar to Section 2(a) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and
Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).” Id.
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of Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”). 94 The revision has been adopted
by forty-nine states, 95 and it provides a modern articulation of the prudence
standards for the management and investment of charitable funds and for
endowment spending. 96 UPMIFA section 3 specifically incorporates the
principles of MPT and the prudence standard found in the UPIA. 97 It
authorizes governing boards to invest in a wide range of personal and real
property, 98 and it sets forth many of the factors a charity should take into
account in making a prudent investment decision. 99 Section 3 also
incorporates the general duty to diversify investments and consider the risk
and return objectives of the fund. 100

94. UPMIFA, supra note 1. UPMIFA applies to charitable “institutions,” a
category that includes incorporated or unincorporated organizations operated
exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or other eleemosynary purposes, or
government entities to the extent they hold funds exclusively for those purposes. Id. at
§ 2(4). It also applies to trusts managed by a charity. Id. The revisers’ goal was that
standards for managing and investing institutional funds should be the same regardless
of whether a charity is organized as a trust, corporation, or some other entity. Id. at
Prefactory Note. However, the rules do not apply to funds of wholly charitable or splitinterest trusts (such as charitable remainder trusts) managed by a corporate or
individual trustee. Id. In most states, those types of charitable trusts are subject to
comparable rules under modern prudent investor statutes. Id.
95. The lone holdout is Pennsylvania.
96. The commentary to Section 3 states in part:
Purpose and Scope of Revisions. This section adopts the prudence standard
for investment decision making. The section directs directors or others
responsible for managing and investing the funds of an institution to act as a
prudent investor would, using a portfolio approach in making investments and
considering the risk and return objectives of the fund. The section lists the
factors that commonly bear on decisions in fiduciary investing and
incorporates the duty to diversify investments absent a conclusion that special
circumstances make a decision not to diversify reasonable.
UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3 cmt. Thus, this section follows modern portfolio theory
for investment decision-making.
97. Id. at § 3.
98. Id. at § 3(e).
99. Id.
100. Id. Except as otherwise provided by a gift instrument, the following rules
apply:
(1) In managing and investing an institutional fund, the following factors, if
relevant, must be considered:
(A) general economic conditions;
(B) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(C) the expected tax consequences, if any, of investment decisions or
strategies;
(D) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the
overall investment portfolio of the fund;
(E) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of
investments;
(F) other resources of the institution;
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UPMIFA’s standard of care is derived from the Internal Revenue Code’s
private foundation regulations dealing with investment responsibility of
managers of private foundations.101 Boards must exercise “the care an
ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise” under the facts
and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision. 102 They
may consider the long and short term needs of the institution in carrying
out its exempt purposes, its present and anticipated financial requirements,
expected total return on its investments, price level trends, and general
economic conditions. The commentary to the section states that the
standard of care is comparable to the business corporate director rather than
a private trustee. Section 5 adopts the delegation standards of UPIA section
nine, 103 and it clarifies the right of nonprofit fiduciaries to delegate and to
contract with independent financial advisors. 104
UPMIFA’s statement of its prudence standard attempts to straddle
between the cautionary language of trust law and the more lenient attitude
toward the duty of care under corporate principles, as evinced in the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act (Third). 105 The UPMIFA comment says that
even though the nonprofit standard is nominally similar to the corporate
standard—the words are the same—there is recognition that the entity is a

(G) the needs of the institution and the fund to make distributions and to
preserve capital; and
(H) an asset’s special relationship or special value, if any, to the
charitable purposes of the institution.
(2) Management and investment decisions about an individual asset must be
made not in isolation but rather in the context of the institutional fund’s
portfolio of investments as a whole and as a part of an overall investment
strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the fund and to
the institution.
(3) Except as otherwise provided by law other than this [act], an institution
may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent with this
section.
(4) An institution shall diversify the investments of an institutional fund
unless the institution reasonably determines that, because of special
circumstances, the purposes of the fund are better served without
diversification.
(5) Within a reasonable time after receiving property, an institution shall
make and carry out decisions concerning the retention or disposition of the
property or to rebalance a portfolio, in order to bring the institutional fund
into compliance with the purposes, terms, and distribution requirements of the
institution as necessary to meet other circumstances of the institution and the
requirements of this [act].
Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (1973).
UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3(b).
Id. at §5 cmt.
Id.
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1987).
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charity and not a business corporation. 106 Significantly, the language of
section 3 dealing with the standard of conduct avoids the word “caution,”
which is found in the trust law equivalent. 107
The comment adds that trust law norms already inform managers of
nonprofit corporations in their decision-making, but then states that trust
precedents have routinely been found to be helpful but not binding
authority. 108 It may be that this language was the result of a political
compromise among the drafters and interest groups. It does not offer
sufficient guidance as to the standard that should be used. In light of the
financial crisis’ impact on endowments in 2008, if there is one guideline
that is needed to remind fiduciaries of their responsibilities, it is caution.
V. CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
By the time the legal framework caught up with and endorsed the MPT,
fissures had appeared in its theoretical framework. In the 1980s, empirical
studies and unexpected events demonstrated anomalies that suggested the
markets were not as efficient as the theory postulated. 109
MPT assumed that risk and return could be accurately calculated, as
could the covariances between them. An efficient securities market would
reflect their fundamental value.110 However, securities’ market prices may
not be good indicators of rationally evaluated economic value. Think of the
many corporate executives and investment analysts who believe certain
106. The standard is consistent with the business judgment standard under
corporate law, as applied to charitable institutions. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3.
107. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 (2010); UPIA, supra note 46 § 2(a);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (1992).
108. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3 cmt.
109. One example is that closed-end funds trade at a discount to their fundamental
value. A closed-end fund is an investment vehicle with a limited number of shares. It is
closed-end because only a limited number of shares are issued and typically shares are
not redeemable until the fund liquidates. Closed-end fund shares are issued in a public
offering and thereafter purchased on a secondary market. In an open-end fund, the fund
management creates new shares in exchange for consideration or redeems outstanding
shares. The price of a share in a closed-end fund that contains publicly traded securities
and pays dividends equal to the dividends on the stocks in its portfolio is valued on the
basis of those dividends. BRATTON, supra note 53 at 15, 26, 774–75. The fundamental
value of the fund is the net asset value of the securities in it divided by the number of
shares in the fund. However, instead of closed-end funds trading at their fundamental
value as would be expected in an efficient market, they usually trade at discounts,
though occasionally they trade at a premium. These discounts cannot be explained in
terms of fundamental value factors. See Reiner Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously:
The Implications of “Discounted Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 891, 902–05 (1988).
110. Fundamental value means that an asset is valued at its future cash flows and
the opportunity cost of capital. If the price equals the fundamental value, the expected
rate of return is the opportunity cost of capital. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note
50, at 321.
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securities are underpriced or overpriced. The statement that diversification
reduces risk without reducing expected return is mathematically true,
assuming there exists a reliable mechanism for ascertaining the risk and
expected return of individual investments. However, some scholarship
questions whether market price accurately reflects risk or return.111
Harry Markowitz, who developed the relationship between maximizing
a portfolio’s expected return for a given amount of risk, never suggested
that the fundamental valuation of a security was easily obtainable.112 It may
be impossible to measure whether stocks are correctly valued because no
one can measure true value with precision.113 Thus, we do not know if
market levels are consistent with fundamentals (i.e. the prospects for profits
or dividends). Periodically, investors exhibit an irrational exuberance
which may push stock prices to an unjustifiable level. Eventually, such
bubbles burst, and investors then may become unduly negative. 114
The “dot com” bubble of 1995 until 2000 led to a NASDAQ Composite
Index rise of five-hundred and eighty percent, only to decline by October
2002 by seventy-eight percent from its peak. 115 The Japanese bubble of
1985 until 1990 and the real estate bubble of the 2000s are other examples
of bubbles and bursts where prices diverged from the fundamental values
predicted by the EMH. 116 However, crashes have occurred without the
antecedent bubble. On October 19, 1987, the New York Stock Exchange
Dow Jones Index declined by over 500 points, and by the end of the month
111. Sterk, supra note 49, at 868. One of the theoretical criticisms of the EMH is
that it cannot be empirically tested.
[W]e cannot test the validity of the efficient market hypothesis alone; every
test of EMH also assumes some particular theory of what the ‘right’ price for
an asset is. These asset pricing models establish the benchmark of ‘normal’
returns in order to determine the efficiency of the market. Consequently,
every empirical test of the efficient market hypothesis is a ‘joint test’ of both
the hypothesis and an asset pricing model. If the test yields evidence
consistent with market efficiency, it also yields evidence consistent with the
asset pricing model. If however, the test yields anomalous evidence, either the
market is inefficient or the asset pricing model used is incorrect (or possibly
both EMH and the pricing model are wrong).
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 772 (1985).
112. Markowitz, supra note 48, at 81 n.7 (“This paper does not consider the
difficult question of how investors do (or should) form their probability beliefs”).
113. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 325.
114. Id. The phrase irrational exuberance was first used by the former chairman of
the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central
Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer
Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996)
(transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/1996
1205.htm#pagetop).
115. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 325.
116. Id. at 325–26.
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had dropped by one third, raising doubts about the theory. 117 The financial
crisis of 2008 called into question the intellectual assumptions upon which
modern investing is based, as well as the legal and regulatory regimes
influenced by the theory. 118
A. Evidence of Market Inefficiencies
As the MPT gained adherents, puzzling evidence emerged of anomalies
in the EMH where actual prices differed from fundamental values. These
anomalies concerned both short term effects and long lasting inefficiencies.
Some could be explained, but others seemed inexplicable, even bizarre.119
Empirical studies challenged the EMH assumptions, 120 leading to an
117.
118.

BRATTON, supra note 53, at 39–40.
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 39–47 (2009) [hereinafter TURNER
REVIEW], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. Lord Adair
Turner, who was the chairman of the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority at the time,
prepared the report.
119. Empirical research discovered: 1) The January Effect: returns are higher in
January than in other months and lower on Monday than on other days of the week.
Most of the daily return comes at the beginning and end of the day. Because of
transaction costs involving infrequent trading, this finding and others do not necessarily
lead to successful trading activity; 2) The Small Firm Effect: longer term inefficiencies
included stocks with the lowest market capitalizations that performed substantially
better than those with the highest capitalizations; 3) The Earnings Announcement
Puzzle: stock performance following the announcement of unexpectedly good or bad
earnings indicated the 10% of securities with the best earnings news outperformed
those with the worst news by about 1% per month over a six month period following
the announcement. Investors apparently underreact to earnings announcements and
become aware of the full significance only as further information arrives; 4) The New
Issue Puzzle: when initial public offerings (“IPOs”) come to market, investors rush to
buy and receive an immediate capital gain if they sell. However, these early gains turn
into losses, if the investor purchased the stock immediately following each IPO and
held onto the issue for five years. From 1970 until 2007, the average annual return
would have been 3.8% less than the return on a portfolio of similarly sized stocks. Id. at
322. These and other conclusions have been criticized or rationalized by other scholars.
Id. at 323; 5) The Sunshine Effect: A study of stock returns in twenty-six countries
found a significant positive correlation between morning sunshine and stock returns.
David Hirschliefer & Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and
Weather, 58 J. FIN. 1009 (2003). Rain and snow are unrelated to stock returns. Another
“mood and markets” study found that in a cross-section of thirty-nine countries using
international soccer results as a primary mood variable, losses in soccer matches have
an economically and statistically significant negative effect on the losing countries’
stock market. For example, a loss in the World Cup elimination stage leads to a next
day abnormal stock return of minus forty-nine basis points. See Alex Edmans, Diego
Rivera & Øyvind Norly, Sports Sentiment & Stock Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1967 (2007).
120. Some of the other diversions from how the EMH is expected to perform
include: 1) volatility: stock prices overreact to changes in fundamentals; stock price
volatility over the past century appears to be too high to be attributable to new
information about dividends; return volatility is greater when the market is open than
when it is closed; suggesting the market makes its own news, which is not keyed to
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ongoing debate over the efficiency of the markets.121
B. Evidence of Investor Irrationality: The Rise of Behavioral Finance
An important assumption of the EMH was that investors were rational
agents and utility maximizers. Irrational investors, those who bought or
sold on the basis of a hunch or other non-rational theories, were irrelevant
to the market. They would be taken advantage of by arbitrageurs,122 and
their systematic losses would drive them from the market. 123
Economics assumes investors, firms, and their managers act as if they
are rational; the fields of sociology and psychology question this
assumption. 124 Behavioral finance applies the teachings of psychology to
the behavior of investors, focusing on experiments that have discovered

fundamentals; 2) timing: documented patterns in stock returns over weekends, holidays
and different calendar periods affect returns—returns tend to be negative on Mondays;
serial correlation—over short periods of time, price changes tend to persist
contradicting the random walk model; 3) contrarian investment strategies: “value”
investing strategies produce high returns over time, which means that high market to
book value firms are growth stocks, favored by the market earn lower returns than
inexpensive “value” stocks; growth stock investors overreact optimistically to recent
history of good news about those stocks; 4) sentiment: investor sentiment may explain
serially correlated returns. For a description of these anomalies and citations to the
literature, see BRATTON, supra note 53, at 25–28.
121. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Multi-Factor Explanations of
Market Pricing Anomalies, 51 J. FIN. 55 (1996); Burton Malkiel, The Efficient Market
Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59 (2003).
122. Arbitrage is a strategy that exploits market efficiencies and generates superior
returns if and when prices return to their fundamental value. The arbitrageur buys an
underpriced security, pushing up its price, and sells an overvalued security, pushing
down that security’s price. The arbitrageur’s profit is the difference between the
irrational price and the fundamental one. However, there are risk and trading costs.
BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 327–28.
123. Gilson & Kraackman, supra note 58, at 583 (discussing that “market
discipline in the form of heavy trading losses will restrain idiosyncratic traders and may
even eliminate them through a ‘Darwinian’ process of natural selection”); Stout, supra
note 41, at 665 (quoting Milton Friedman, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, in
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 175 (1953)). If prices diverged from their fundamental
value, arbitrageurs would exploit the price differential and drive the price back to its
fundamental value. However, there may be more irrational traders than the EMH
assumed, and arbitrage opportunities may be more risky and limited than initially
believed. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to
Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., 19, 20–23 (1990). For arbitrage trading, costs can be
significant, some trades can be difficult to execute, and the market may diverge from
fundamental prices before it converges, making it difficult for the arbitrageur to hold on
until the market moves in the right direction. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note
50, at 327.
124. Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A
Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2011).
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investors often acted through their personal biases in a non-rational way. 125
These investors, termed noise traders, act on the basis of their beliefs,
personal experiences, the advice of their brokers or stock gurus, or chase
popular trends, rather than on the basis of fundamentals.126 Behavioral
finance research suggests that irrational investors are not only a larger
cohort than previously believed, but that they can affect market prices and
profit over time, more than the MPT believed was possible. 127

125. The idea that passion rather than reason is the dominant element in human
action was the view of philosopher David Hume. See, DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (“Reason
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other
office than to serve and obey them.”). See In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917,
938 (Del Ch. 2003) for a related judicial expression.
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that
simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of
the law and economics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo
economicus. We may be thankful that an array of other motivations exist that
influence human behavior; not all are any better than greed or avarice, think
of envy, to name just one. But also think of motives like love, friendship, and
collegiality, think of those among us who direct their behavior as best they
can on a guiding creed or set of moral values.
Id.
126. BRATTON, supra note 53, at 29; Shleifer & Summers, supra note 123, at 19.
127. Among the conclusions about investor behavior that contradict the MPT’s
assumptions are: 1) Loss aversion—psychological experiments discovered that people
may be more loss averse than risk averse. This means that the value investors place on
an outcome is affected by their fear of incurring losses. Rather than viewing the current
value of their holdings for investment decision-making, they consider whether their
investment has shown a gain or a loss. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect
theory, based on this insight, posits that the value investors place on a particular
outcome is determined by the gains or losses they have incurred since the asset was
acquired or the holding last reviewed. Investors are particularly averse to the possibility
of even small losses and need a high return to compensate for this. BREALEY, MYERS &
ALLEN, supra note 50, at 326. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). This
translates that investors will hold on to a stock too long, rather than selling it as a
rational trader would do; 2) Investors that have incurred gains are more likely to take
risks. Thus, if investors are ahead in a security, they may be more prepared to take risks
of losses than if they already have suffered losses in that security; 3) An incorrect
estimation of probabilities. Psychologists have found that when judging the probability
of future outcomes, investors look at a very small sample of similar situations and
overreact to that result and project it into the future. This is termed the
Representativeness Heuristic. For instance, an investment manager may be considered
particularly skilled because he or she has beaten the market in three consecutive years.
BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 50, at 326; BRATTON, supra note 53, at 36
(citing David Kahneman & Mark Riepe, Aspects of Investor Psychology, 24 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 52 (1998)). The investor may not acknowledge that three or five
years is too short of a time frame to make an informed judgment. The legendary hedge
fund manager, John Paulson, confirms this statement: In 2007 and 2008 at the height of
the financial crisis, Paulson earned $20 billion for betting against subprime mortgagebacked securities and global financial firms. In 2009 he extended his winning streak by
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Behavioral finance emphasizes that the limits to arbitrage and noise
traders’ widespread biases and hunches push prices away from their
fundamental values. It delivers significant challenges to the MPT but is far
from a knockout blow and remains controversial. Critics have concluded
that the studies may be useful to arbitrageurs, but they offer theorists
merely a prediction that securities’ prices sometimes depart from informed
estimates of securities’ values in arbitrary and capricious ways. 128
VI. WHAT WENT WRONG?
A. The Underestimation of Uncertainty
The MPT dealt effectively with conveying the need for management of
risk but failed to adequately acknowledge the constant presence of
uncertainty. It assumed the risk characteristics of financial markets could
be inferred from mathematical analyses that would deliver accurate
quantitative measures of trading risk. Correlations between risk and return
are more difficult to value than assumed. The underlying methodological
assumption was that accurate estimates can be based upon statistical
analyses of past performance. There was an overreliance that past price
movement patterns could deliver statistically robust inferences relating to
the probability of price movements in the future. 129

being bullish on the stock market, and he invested in gold before the price climbed,
earning for himself nearly $5 billion in 2010. Since then, one of his largest hedge funds
has lost nearly 50% of its value because of mistimed investments on banks and other
stocks. One of his single investments lost $500 million in 2011. See Gregory
Zuckerman, Suit Faults Paulson’s Sino-Forest Bet, WALL ST. J. Feb. 22, 2012, at C2;
Azam Ahmed, JAT Capital, Down 20%, Is a Lesson In Volatility, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2012, at B1. Past success is no predictor of future profits; 4) Conservativeness.
Individual investors tend to be too slow to update their beliefs in light of new evidence.
They will eventually update their beliefs in the correct direction but the magnitude of
the change is less than a rational response would mandate. BREALEY, ALLEN & MYERS,
supra note 44, at 326; BRATTON, supra note 53, at 36 (citing Nicholas Barberis, Andrei
& Robert Vishny, A Model of Investor Sentiment, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 307 (1998)); 5)
Overconfidence. Investors are systematically overconfident about their investment
prowess, which exaggerates the precision of their private judgments about the value of
a security and underestimates the significance of public signals or the possibility of
unexpected events. BREALEY, ALLEN & MYERS, supra note 44, at 326; BRATTON, supra
note 53, at 36 (citing Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subramanyam,
Investor Psychology and Security Market Under and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839
(1998)).
128. Stout, supra note 41, at 661. The classic rejoinder to behavioral finance is by
Merton Miller, a Nobel Laureate in economic sciences: “That we abstract from all these
stories in building our models is not because the stories are uninteresting but because
they may be too interesting and thereby distract us from the pervasive market forces
that should be our principal concern.” Merton H. Miller, Behavioral Rationality in
Finance: The Case of Dividends, 59 J. BUS. S451–S467 (1986).
129. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 118, at 1.4(iii). The models to measure risk used
by financial firms, VaR or “value at risk,” were flawed. Douglas O. Edwards, An
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Probabilities based on historical data assumed normal distributions in the
shape of a bell curve as one would find in the natural sciences.130 In fact,
several events in recent decades—the sudden market drop of 1987, the
Long Term Capital meltdown in 1999, the “dot com” bust of 2000, and the
financial crisis of 2008—underestimated the full distribution of price
movements. These events lead to the conclusion that financial market
movements are characterized more than ever imagined by what are known
as fat-tails or black swans—events considered so rare they need not be
considered as a measure of risk, but in fact occur more frequently than
predicted. 131
Though a Nobel Prize is given for economic sciences, economics and
finance are very different from the certainties of the natural sciences. As
Emanuel Derman, a physicist who later served as a head of quantitative
analysis at Goldman Sachs, has written, “[i]n physics you’re playing
against God, and He doesn’t change His laws very often. In finance, you’re
playing against God’s creatures, agents who value assets based on their
ephemeral opinions.” 132 The belief in the mathematical rigor of statistics’
ability to predict risk blinded proponents of the MPT to the constant
presence of uncertainty, about which the brightest minds have warned. In
Kenneth Arrow’s words, “[i]t is my view that most individuals
underestimate the uncertainty of the world. . . .To me our knowledge of the
way things work, in society or in nature, comes trailing clouds of

Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk Management Incentives After The Financial
Crisis of 2007–2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 266–67 (2010). VaR measures the
potential loss in value of an asset or portfolio at a given confidence level over a
specified period. To the advantage of investment professionals, it communicates risk
exposure in a single dollar amount that is supposed to show how much a firm has at
risk on a particular day. VaR models have come under criticism for underestimating
rare or unprecedented events and for failing to consider correlations among risks or
coupling of risks. Kristin Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’
Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55 (2011).
130. A bell curve or normal distribution is tall and wide in the middle where most
things measured occur and drops or flattens out at the ends or bottoms, making the
whole distribution resemble a bell.
131. In finance, a fat tail refers to price movements far more variable than models
of risk predicted. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 118, at 1.4(iii). A Black Swan is an
event with the following three attributes. First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the
realm of regular expectations because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its
possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status,
human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it
explainable and predictable. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT
OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE xvii–xix, 141–42 (2007). The Turner Review criticizes the
idea that past distribution patterns carry robust influence for the probability of future
patterns of distinguishing between the world of physics, the world of the natural
sciences, and the world of social sciences (such as economics). TURNER REVIEW, supra
note 118.
132. EMANUEL DERMAN, MODELS BEHAVING BADLY: WHY CONFUSING ILLUSION
WITH REALITY CAN LEAD TO DISASTER, ON WALL STREET AND IN LIFE 140 (2011).
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vagueness. Vast ills have followed a belief in certainty.” 133
The MPT remains, as it should, the fundamental approach to portfolio
investing. Yet, its practitioners need to be more cautious about its promises
and parsimonious about its capability to manage risk in all circumstances.
The MPT may only apply in certain markets involving certain securities
and investments in that market. Understanding the limits of the MPT may
lead to more informed policies of acceptable risk.
B. The Financial Crisis
Aside from the staggering declines in endowment values, the 2008
financial crisis presented three problems for acolytes of the endowment
model of investing: 1) insufficient liquidity existed for endowments to
contribute to annual budgetary obligations at the same dollar level, which
impacted normal operations and undermined one of the rationalizations for
massive endowments; 2) increased collateral obligations to hedge funds
and private equity partners mandated investing additional resources,
thereby exacerbating endowments’ liquidity problems; 134 and 3) a lack of
resources to pursue newly cheap investment opportunities.
133. Kenneth J. Arrow, I Know a Hawk from a Handsaw, in EMINENT
ECONOMISTS: THEIR LIFE PHILOSOPHIES 46 (Michael Szenberg ed. 1992). Professor
Arrow received the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. The ongoing presence of
uncertainty with regularity was expressed in 1703 by the great mathematician Gottfried
Liebnitz: “Nature has established patterns originating in the return of events, but only
for the most part.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 52, at 329.
This has been echoed by John Maynard Keynes, who wrote:
If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of knowledge for
estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile
factory, the good will of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the
City of London amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years
hence . . . Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the
instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of
our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a
mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most
probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a
result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction,
and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits
multiplied by quantitative probabilities . . . We are merely reminding
ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or
political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since
the basis for making such calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate
urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves
choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we
can, but often falling back for our motive or whim or sentiment or chance.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, &
MONEY 149–50, 161–66 (1936).
134. Many of the illiquid investments contained options by the counterparty to call
for additional funds from college and university investors.
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Alternative investments’ illiquidity and volatility increased losses in
2008, affecting results of the fiscal year 2009. The alternative investments
were difficult to unload. Prices offered in secondary markets were so low
that major college and university endowments pulled back from selling. 135
Proponents of the endowment model of investing correctly point out that
even with such losses, the long term returns were greater than if the
endowments remained invested in equities and bonds. This justification,
however, ignores the impact of the losses on college and university
programs and on its constituencies and the wider community.
During this period, colleges, universities, and other charities largely
ignored the theoretical justifications for their endowments—spending more
to smooth out flows of revenue in lean years and ensuring intergenerational
equity for today’s students. 136 Peter Conti-Brown posits a trade-off between
additional spending and selling assets to increase liquidity and reducing the
annual budget contribution of the endowment. Colleges and universities
took the latter course of cutting budgets, firing staff, and deferring new
projects, which disrupted essential college and university functions. 137
Harvard, which in recent history has competed with Yale and Stanford for
first place in the endowment performance derby, offers a cautionary tale of
the dangers of excessive risk and illiquidity. It invested a huge amount in
swaps, financial instruments that lock in interest rates, with the expectation
that rates would rise in the future when the University would borrow
heavily to build its new Allston campus. 138 After the financial markets
unexpectedly collapsed in 2007, central banks reduced some bank lending
135. Harvard unsuccessfully attempted to sell $1.5 billion in private-equity stakes
on the secondary market in fall 2008. It then made a $2.5 billion bond offering to cover
swaps agreements that were wagers that interest rates would rise, when Harvard build
its Allston campus. When rates fell to near zero, Harvard had to pay a margin call on
$1 billion to large banks. The University paid approximately $100 million to unwind
swaps related to hundreds of millions of dollars in variable rate borrowings. The
ultimate cost to the University was $1.8 billion. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 733–
35; Michael McDonald, John Lauerman & Gillian Wee, Harvard Swaps Are So Toxic
Even Summers Won’t Explain, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2009, 4:28 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aHQ2Xh55jI.Q;
Tellus
Report, supra note 17, at 37–38. Other colleges and universities found themselves in
similar situations, though not quite of the same scale.
136. See Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 2–3. A few nonprofit institutions such as
the New York City Opera tapped into their endowments to cover enormous budget
deficits. This provided temporary relief but ultimately did not save the organization.
See James B. Stewart, A Ransacked Endowment at New York City Opera, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 12, 2013, at B1; Daniel J. Wakin, New York City Opera to Leave Lincoln Center,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, at A1; Daniel J. Wakin, City Opera Taps Into Endowment,
N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2009, at C2.
137. Conti-Brown observes that the financial crisis may have given college and
university administrators the opportunity to cut into areas that were justified, but which
in the good years were politically impossible. Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 740.
138. McDonald, Lauerman & Wee, supra note 135.
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rates to zero. This meant the value of the swaps declined and as part of its
swaps agreements, Harvard had to post approximately $1 billion in
collateral. 139 To a lesser extent, other schools were in the same position.
Private equity investments often have future call commitments, which
require investors to put up additional funds upon request. Were the
possibilities of private equity calls and posting additional swaps collateral
factored into the risk models? Or were the risk models inaccurate?
As the endowment sunk, Harvard’s cash account declined sharply. The
University did what individuals do when they need cash—they borrowed—
$2.5 billion, of which nearly $500 million was used to terminate the swaps
agreements. 140 Harvard’s problems were exacerbated by the percentage of
the endowment allocated to illiquid assets. Even the cash account, normally
invested conservatively in short-term commercial paper and money market
funds, had been eighty percent invested along with the endowment, which
was an extremely risky move. The impact on the university was substantial.
Capital spending was cut in half, and the building of the new campus
postponed. There were layoffs, closure of libraries, pay freezes, and budget
cuts. 141 Endowment performance in 2008 and administrators’ responses
called into question the new endowment model, though few universities
jettisoned it. 142
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Stephanie Strom, Nonprofits Paying Price For Gamble on Finances, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at A16; Beth Healy, Harvard Ignored Warnings about
Investments, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/
local/massachusetts/articles/2009/11/29/harvard_ignored_warnings_about_inv
estments/; McDonald, Lauerman & Wee, supra note 135.
Other large endowment institutions were similarly affected. Stanford University
intended to sell $5 billion of illiquid assets to raise cash but later pulled back because
the markets improved or the offers were too low. Craig Karmin and Peter Lattman,
Stanford Pulls Asset Sales Off Auction Block, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, at C1. Yale
University reduced staff, froze salaries for deans and officers, reduced the number of
graduate students, and turned down the heat to sixty-eight degrees in order to close a
$150 million budget deficit. Lisa W. Foderaro, Yale, With $150 Million Deficit, Plans
Staff and Research Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.4, 2010, at A28. Cornell laid off 150 staff
and another 432 took early retirement. Princeton University eliminated forty-three
positions in order to reduce its operating budget by $170 million over two years. See
infra Appendix I. Despite the recovery of Harvard’s endowment, the cutbacks have
remained. See Jennifer Levitz, Economy Tests Harvard, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2012, at
A3. In the fiscal year 2012, Harvard paid $345.3 million in terminating interest rate
swaps, bringing the cost of unwinding debt derivatives to more than $1.25 billion. John
Lauerman & Michael McDonald, Harvard University Lost $US345.3 Million
Terminating Interest-Rate Sawps, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2013, 8:38 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-08/harvard-swap-toll-tops-1-4-billionending-deals-in-2012-2013.html (“Harvard University, the world’s richest college, lost
$345.3 million terminating interest-rate swaps last year, bringing its cost of unwinding
debt derivatives since 2008 to more than $US1.25 billion.”).
142. Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 731; Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 22–24.
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C. Second Tier Endowments
Colleges and universities with endowments less than $1 billion used a
modified form of the endowment model of investing, which in the good
years did not achieve as high returns as the largest proponents of the model.
They were unable to invest in some particularly successful hedge funds
because the minimum capital accepted was beyond their means, or they
would skew their portfolio allocations by placing too great a percent of
their portfolio in illiquid assets with unacceptable levels of volatility. Some
private equity investments may have been closed to them, or the
endowment was unwilling or unable to tie up so much money for long
periods and be subject to calls for more capital.
Often, they utilized investment pools such as Commonfund, an
endowment manager for nearly 1,500 institutions offering a variety of
funds of differing risk, 143 or The Investment Fund for Foundations, which
offers charities access to a diverse group of asset classes at relatively low
cost. 144 These endowments did not have the capacity themselves to evaluate
outside investment managers so they retained outside experts, such as the
Commonfund or others, to vet investment possibilities. All but the largest
endowments have private consulting firms or supervisors of investment
managers to monitor and steer assets into approved investment vehicles.
This is not free advice, so returns may be reduced. Some endowments
invested in so-called funds of funds, which also lowered possible returns. 145
D. Oversight Problems and Lack of Understanding of Investments
Problems using the new endowment model of investing emerged even
before the financial crisis. Although UPMIFA and UPIA encourage a
delegation of investment management, a nonprofit board cannot thereafter
abdicate its responsibility to monitor the delegates and to understand the
nature of the investment strategy. 146 Several universities failed in this
regard. The University of Minnesota System and the University of
Minnesota Foundation reached an out-of-court settlement with a money
But see William Jarvis, Is the Endowment Model Still Working?, 18 TRUSTEESHIP 20
(Mar.-Apr. 2010). Data in NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments in 2010 did
not show a turning away from the endowment model, which still was able to deliver
around 270 basis points per year of extra value.
(Apr.
4,
2014,
10:17
PM),
143. About
Us,
COMMONFUND
http://www.commonfund.org/ABOUTUS/Pages/default.aspx.
144. See LUIS M. VICEIRA & BRENDON C. PARRY, THE INVESTMENT FUND FOR
FOUNDATIONS (TIFF) IN 2009 (2010).
145. A Fund of Funds (FOF) invests in other hedge and private equity, providing
added diversification along with double fees, those of the underlying funds, and of the
FOF.
146. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 5(3) (2006); UPIA, supra note 46, at § 9(a)(3)
(1994).
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management firm because the firm failed to inform officials at the
University of the risks involved in trading derivative instruments invested
on the University’s behalf. 147 DePauw University sued an investment
advisory firm and its principals alleging that they failed to thoroughly
investigate the hedge funds they recommended and misrepresented facts
about them. 148 Because of bad investments into alternative investments,
poor investment advice, and a seeming ignorance of the benefits of
diversification of endowment assets, Cooper Union ended a 110-year “no
tuition” policy and was forced to charge its students $20,000 tuition. 149
The 2008 financial crisis exposed gaps in trustee oversight and generated
litigation from charities claiming they were misled into investing in
vehicles that were much riskier than imagined or illiquid. The University of
Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University lost the $114 million they
invested in Westridge Capital Management, a firm run by two individuals
accused of using the firm as a personal piggy bank. 150 It had been vetted
with approval by consulting firms. 151 The universities had relied on the
recommendation of an outside investment consultant and were lured by the
promise of big returns on alternative investments. 152
E. Lessons Learned and Unlearned
The lessons of behavioral finance and the unexpected events of recent
years pose challenges to the application of the MPT but do not eliminate it
as the fundamental method for endowment investment. They do raise
important signals concerning the need for caution and an increased
appreciation of risk for endowment investing strategies. The answer to the
147. Kim Strosnider, Settlement Reached at University of Minnesota, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 28, 1997, at A42.
148. The University had invested $3.25 million in one of the Bayou Group’s hedge
funds. Bayou fabricated its returns and collapsed in 2005. See Ian McDonald, Clients
Are Suing Hennessee Group Over Bayou Advice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15–16, 2005, at B6.
The collapse also ensnared the Christian Brothers School of Nashville, which had
invested $1.2 million. The bankruptcy trustee was successful in clawing back the
redemption of that investment because the school was on notice when it redeemed that
something was wrong at the fund. See In re Bayou Group, 396 B.R. 810 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2008).
149. James B. Stewart, How Errors in Investing Cost a College Its Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2013, at B1.
150. See Paul Fain, 2 Universities Seek Answers After $114-Million Vanishes in an
Alleged Swindle, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 5, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/ 2Universities-Seek-Answers/1565/. Carnegie Mellon eventually received more than $40million in restitution. Andrew Mytelka, Carnegie Mellon U. Gets $40-Million Returned
from Investment Swindle, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/carnegie-mellon-u-gets-40-million-returned-frominvestment-swindle/32389.
151. Tellus Report, supra note 17, at 24.
152. See Fain, supra note 150; Mytelka, supra note 150.
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question, “what went wrong?” is the under appreciation of risk and the
overconfidence in the ability to manage it. The MPT may only apply in
certain markets involving particular securities.
We are living in a period of financial turbulence. Investors and markets
have underestimated the probability of extreme volatility. Risk is greater
and more unpredictable than the MPT posits. The MPT presumed that
future volatility would replicate the present and the past, but recent events
have shown that is not so, at least in the probabilities expected. In periods
of great volatility and economic upheaval, covariance changes are much
greater and much more unpredictable than normal. The rational actions of
investors in normal times can collectively become irrational. 153 Many
investment vehicles used in endowment portfolios are opaque, illiquid, and
incapable of adequate analyses of the risk, the probabilities of return, or the
relationship between the two.
The high returns initially generated by the endowment model of
investing disguised the limits of the MPT’s risk management techniques.
The elegance of the theory encouraged people to believe more than it
actually promised. The endowment model led to investments in markets
and financial products where neither variance nor expected earnings could
be derived with any degree of confidence. Harry Markowitz, the discoverer
of the relationship between risk and return, seems to have stepped back
from the extension of the theory into private placements commodities and
beyond, “[t]hese assets . . . must be properly valued and thus, are best left
to people like Warren Buffet or David Swenson.” 154
Even after the harsh lessons of 2008, prudence and humility are in short
supply by investment committees and their advisors. Despite the sobering
experience of the financial crisis, large and small endowments invested
more heavily in illiquid alternative investments in an effort to squeeze
additional returns from the low interest rate environment. 155 However,
because of the strength of the equity markets in 2013, college and
university endowments have cut their alternative investment allocations. 156
In uncertain times, endowment investment policies should reflect a
153. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 112 (2009).
154. Alan Lavine, Harry Markowitz Father of Modern Portfolio Still Diversified,
101 FIN. HIST. 17, 19 (Fall 2011).
155. 2012 NCSE, supra note “4, at 6.
156. In the fiscal year 2013, the average allocation in alternative investments fell
from 54% to 47%. NAT. ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2013 NACUBOCOMMUNFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS (2013) [hereinafter 2013 NCSE]. Yale reduced
its private equity exposure to 31% for the fiscal year 2014 from 35.3 in 2012, the first
reduction in that investment class since 2005. Michael McDonald, Colleges Cut
Alternative Investments to Recoup Losses, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg. com/news/2013-11-06/colleges-cut-alternative-investments-torecoup-losses.html.
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heightened element of caution and prudence into the investing equation.
Given the composition and dynamics of college and university boards, this
may be difficult to achieve.
VII. GOVERNING BOARD OVERSIGHT OF INVESTMENT POLICY
Ultimately, the governing body is responsible for monitoring an
institution’s endowment. While it is difficult to generalize about the
composition of college and university boards, one can suggest that they
primarily are made up of successful alumni involved in business activity,
prominent individuals who have supported the institution, plus others who
give representation to some of the college or university’s constituencies.
Several trustees are likely to be involved in financial services, but that does
not mean in and of itself they are knowledgeable about investment strategy
or risk management.
A. Organizational Structures for Managing Endowments
The organizational structures for managing endowments differ. One
approach is the self-standing management company with a separate board
of trustees appointed by the college or university’s governing board and
including some overlap of membership between the managing company’s
board and the college or university’s governing body. Examples of this
approach include Duke (DUMAC), Harvard (Harvard Management
Company), and Stanford (Stanford Management Company). The
management company’s board is responsible for asset allocation decisions
and supervision of the management company. The college or university’s
governing board ultimately controls the management company and
determines annual endowment spending rates.157 Another model is for the
governing board’s investment committee to oversee the committee or
investment office that manages the endowment. 158
157. Princeton illustrates this approach. Princo, the University’s management
company, serves as the manager of over one hundred external financial managers of
hedge funds, private equity companies, real estate, and alternative investments.
Princo’s board of directors determines how assets are to be allocated among major
investment categories. The twelve member board includes members of the Committee
on Finance of Princeton’s Board of Trustees. The Committee on Finance approves the
annual endowment spending rate and has an annual joint meeting with Princo’s Board.
PRINCETON UNIV. OFFICE OF FINANCE AND TREASURY, ENDOWMENT 101 7 (2011),
available at www.princeton.edu/vpsec/cpuc/. . ./2-23-2012-meeting-summary.pdf.
158. Brown, Cornell, Michigan, Penn, and Texas among many others follow this
approach. At Yale, the Yale Corporation Investment Committee is responsible for
oversight of the endowment and portfolio policy formulation. The Investment
Committee consists of at least three Fellows of the Corporation and other persons with
particular investment expertise. The Committee meets quarterly, at which time
members review asset allocation policies, endowment performance, and strategies
proposed by investments office staff. The Committee approves guidelines for
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Most colleges and universities rely on external managers, such as
Commonfund or The Investment Fund for Foundations, to invest ninetyfive to one hundred percent of their endowments. 159 This figure implies that
most endowments are passively invested with investment committees
determining overall strategy or reaffirming the recommendations of the
chief investment officer. The largest endowments monitor more directly the
external managers of endowment assets, the hedge funds, and private
equity firms. 160 The board or its investment committee will select an asset
allocation approach that satisfies the institution’s appetite for risk. The
external investment advisory firm may manage some funds in which the
endowment directly invests, or it may serve as an adviser and monitor of
hedge funds and other asset vehicles making investment recommendations
for the particular endowment.
Harvard, through the Harvard Management Company, has a unique
hybrid approach. It directly manages approximately one-third of its
endowment assets internally, a higher percentage by far than other
endowments. The remainder is handled by third party managers. Harvard
maintains that its approach is more cost effective, leading to greater returns
for the endowment. 161
B. Investment Committees
Most endowments are monitored by an investment or finance committee,
composed of individuals experienced in finance and successful in that field.
They have the skill set to work with college and university endowment
staff and outside investment advisers and managers. An investment

investment of the Endowment portfolio, specifying investment objectives, spending
policy, and approaches for the investment of each asset category. THE YALE
ENDOWMENT 2011 27 (2011) [hereinafter YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2011], available
at http://www.yale.edu/investments/ Endowment_Update.pdf.
159. The 2012 NCSE study reported that the 823 institutions surveyed employed
an average 1.6 full-time equivalent employees to manage their endowments. 2013
NCSE, supra note 4. An outside consultant is used to manage the endowment by 81%
of the responding institutions. Id.
160. A major staff responsibility at Yale’s Investment Office is finding and
working with high quality external managers, or as it terms them, “partners.” The
Investments Office’s staff meets with many prospective investment managers each
year. It then eliminates most candidates and conducts numerous layers of due diligence
on compelling candidates. Yale chooses to partner with managers with whom the
University can develop long-lasting relationships. The average manager tenure in
Yale’s portfolio is eleven years. YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 158, at
19.
161. HARVARD MANAGEMENT CO., A UNIQUE INVESTMENT MODEL (2010),
available at http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/.investment-management/hybrid_model.html.
In 2010, the Harvard Management Company had an annual operating budget of $67
million and employed approximately 180 people, including 40 investment
professionals. Perold & Stafford, supra note 67.
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committee should bring discipline to the endowment management process
by reviewing staff or external managers’ investment recommendations, but
its ultimate authority yields to staff expertise. The investment committee
manages the process, not the portfolio. 162 Their monitoring is supportive,
passive, if not nominal. They are likely to have a similar mindset with staff
or external managers.
The investment committee or its equivalent drives board discussions of
endowment policy. These individuals’ expertise contrasts with other board
members and engenders a respect in their views by the latter. Investment
professionals are likely to be self-confident individuals with a high level of
self-esteem. They may exhibit a greater willingness to take and tolerate
risk, believing in their ability to understand and control it, thereby
underestimating its threat.163
Over-optimism is a common trait in the world of finance, particularly
among successful and intelligent investment professionals. Such
individuals are confident of their ability to navigate the financial markets.
Successful risk-taking led to extraordinary endowment growth in the
1990s, when double-digit increments became the norm in the largest
endowments and encouraged increased risk taking among their smaller
brethren. This fed into an optimistic risk culture with a payoff of great
rewards for the endowment and for its investment advisers and
managers. 164 Investment committees became risk complacent. They may

162. The Yale Endowment Report describes the relationship between the
investment committee and staff:
Ideally, committees rarely exercise the power to reject staff recommendations.
If a committee frequently turns down or revises investment proposals, the
staff encounters difficulty in managing the portfolio. Investment opportunities
often require negotiation of commitments subject to board approval. If the
board withholds approval with any degree of regularity, staff loses credibility
in the eyes of the investment management community. That said, the
committee must provide more than a rubber stamp for staff recommendations.
YALE ENDOWMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 158, at 27. Thus, the investment
committee is allied with endowment staff.
163. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285–304 (2004). Recent events involving the
supposedly best-managed American bank, JPMorganChase, show that excessive risk
taking, lax controls, and inaccurate risk models remain alive and active on Wall Street,
and this should provide a cautionary tale to college and university trustees. See Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/ jpmorgantrading-loss-may-reach-9-billion/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Nelson D. Schwartz
& Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Was Warned about Lax Risk Controls, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2012, at B1; Julie Steinberg and Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Models
Get Regulatory Spotlight, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2012, at C1.
164. Langevoort, supra note 124, at 1219–20. Investment advisers at endowments
are often paid for performance, receiving bonuses for exceeding benchmarks. This
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have been unduly influenced by their endowment’s returns, compared with
similarly situated competitors. The endowment derby overshadowed the
twin endowment missions of stability and intergenerational equity and
reinforced risk tolerance.165
C. Board Cohesion
A substantial body of literature views boards as complex social units,
subject to the same social and psychological influences that affect such
groups generally. 166 To work effectively, boards prefer consensus,
approval, and group solidarity. A leading criterion for board service is the
individual’s identification and acceptance of the organization’s goals and
methods of operation. 167 Most college and university governing board
members are alumni and share the status rewards and prestige such service
brings. They may have professional or personal relationships among
themselves. Cohesive boards often come from the similar social and
economic milieus. This is not to suggest that board personalities and their
internal dynamics do not vastly differ, but various social influences shape
board behavior and deliberation. 168
D. Deference in Decision-making
The pressures of cohesion make board oversight of endowment policy
difficult. The endowment model of investing is complex, if not
unfathomable to the uninitiated. 169 Because of a substantial knowledge
method of compensation encourages risk taking as it does at hedge funds and
investment banks.
165. Conti-Brown, supra note 3, at 736–37, 740.
166. Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, And The Unintended Consequences of Independence And Accountability, 89
GEO.L.J. 797, 810. (2001).
167. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
83, 91 (1985). Another important consideration is compatibility with other board
members. Selection practices promote cooperation, consensus, and uniformity of view.
Id. at 91–92.
168. Social influence refers to the phenomenon that individuals tend to conform
their conduct to that of other individuals. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362 (1997). Social influence shapes
values. Individuals tend to adapt their convictions to those of their peers. Such adaption
can occur rapidly once individuals are exposed to information about their peers’
attitudes. Id. at 358–59. This has also been termed structural bias where members of a
board or group are favorably disposed to each other. See Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process
Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate
Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 286 (2012). See also Julian Velasco, Structural Bias
and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 824–25 (2004).
169. The complexity and quantification of investment analysis hinders disclosure
and obscures explanation and consequences (i.e. risk) even to experts; See generally
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deficit, it is difficult for board members unfamiliar with finance to pose
questions about endowment policy. In a sense, in the matter of endowment
investing policy, boards may be captured by the investment committee and
the investment advisers.
Boards exhibiting a high degree of cohesion are likely to think alike.
Such groups may be subject to a subconscious censorship of diverging
opinions or viewpoints counter to the majority. Directors with financial
expertise receive undue deference from other board members, which results
in deliberations that may be empty formulaic approvals without adequate
deliberation of alternative approaches.170 Investment policy is complex, and
informational asymmetries between non-financial services board members
and investment professionals compound the problem of chilling dissent. 171
Non-expert directors need assistance in interpreting investment and risk
policy, which they may not receive, and even if they do, they may not
understand the information. A rising endowment may quiet any board
concerns hiding the risk level of the endowment, particularly amongst
trustees without financial expertise.
A college or university board needs to develop a culture of oversight of
investment strategy that involves the full board and not merely the
investment committee. Ideally, boards should have members experienced
in risk management. That, however, is unlikely to occur. 172
VIII. IMPROVING BOARD OVERSIGHT OF ENDOWMENT RISK
Risk oversight should be a governance responsibility of the board. It
consists of the process of reviewing, assessing, and categorizing various
types of risk to which an endowment and the institution are exposed.173
Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
211, 221–25 (2009) (discussing how complexity of modern investment securities can
hinder disclosure and conceal consequences).
170. This has been termed “group think,” where directors place allegiance to
fellow board members ahead of the organization’s best interests, undermining social
norms that facilitate sound governance procedures. Melanie Leslie, The Wisdom of
Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179 (2010). It has
also been called “herding behavior.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 28–29, 32 (2002)
(finding that the desire to maintain group cohesion trumps the exercise of critical
judgment).
171. Leslie, supra note 170, at 1197.
172. The absence of board members knowledgeable about risk management is not
limited to college and university endowments, but played a role in financial institutions
that collapsed or needed to be bailed out during the financial crisis. See Paul Strebel,
Time to bring real shareholders back on board, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009),
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/futur
e-envir-O-0902.pdf.
173. Risk management involves more than the financial risk of an endowment
imploding. It includes ensuring that systems are in place to protect against occurrences
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College and university boards should follow their corporate counterparts by
giving risk oversight a higher profile in the governance portfolio.
The best way to involve the full governing board in evaluating the
endowment’s risk policy would be to create a board level Risk Oversight
Committee (“ROC”). This approach to foreseeing and managing risk is
mandated for large bank holding companies and other covered companies
under the Dodd-Frank Act,174 and it is recommended by the Walker Report
which reviewed corporate governance in U.K. banks and other financial
institutions. 175 It offers a possible template for college and university
boards, for what is a college or university endowment but the institution’s
in-house bank?
Colleges and universities are increasingly complicated institutions and
face a number of types of risk, of which endowment volatility is but one.
The NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE) 2013
preliminary data shows that even after the events of 2008, colleges and
universities seem not very concerned with endowment risk. 176 For the first
time, the NCSE 2013 survey will publish information about risk oversight

that put the institution’s reputation in peril as well as strategic planning on how to deal
with such events. For example, planning on how to prevent and respond to catastrophic
events that may damage the institution: scandals, shootings, fires, and similar tragedies.
There is an overlap obviously with the audit functions of installing reporting systems,
but risk oversight would include crisis management scenarios. This article deals with
financial risks, but recognizes that is but one part of the risk oversight portfolio.
174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 165(3), 124 Stat. 1375, 1423–32 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365)
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1)(A)(iii) for the risk
management standards. On December 11, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board requested
comments on a proposed rule to implement the requirements of § 165. See Enhanced
Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies:
Proposed Rules Request for Comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 594-663 (Jan. 5, 2012), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-01-05/pdf/2011-33364.pdf. The New York
Stock Exchange requires listed companies to provide disclosure about their risk
oversight practices including information about the board’s role in managing risk. See
N.Y. Stock Exchange Listed Companies Manual § 303A.07(b)(i)(1).
175. DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.K. BANKS AND
OTHER
FINANCIAL
INDUSTRY
ENTITIES
(2009),
available
at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
walker_review_261109.pdf.. Recommendations twenty-three through twenty-seven
deal with the governance of risk. Id. at 19–20. The report recommended that banks or
life insurance companies should establish a board risk committee separate from the
audit committee, which should have responsibility for oversight and advice to the board
on current risk exposures of the entity and future risk strategy. Id. at 19. The board
should have a chief risk officer, who would participate at the highest level on an
enterprise-wide basis and report to the board risk committee. Id. The risk committee’s
activities should be included as a separate report within the annual report. Id. at 20.
176. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2013 NCSE PRELIMINARY
RELEASE
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/
2013NCSEPreliminaryPressRelease.pdf [hereinafter 2013 NCSE Preliminary Release].
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by endowments. 177 The preliminary data indicates that forty-five percent of
participating institutions employ risk limits on their portfolio, while thirtythree percent do not. 178 Sixty-nine percent of those using risk limits use
volatility calculations, and fifty-four percent use measures such as
alpha/beta analysis; thirty-nine percent use stress testing or scenario
analysis. 179 These are surprisingly low figures, indicating that when boards
delegate their endowment investment strategy to outside managers, many
do not oversee the risks in their portfolios beyond making a decision on
allocation of investment classes. 180
Endowment risk oversight is not usually carried out by a separate board
committee; rather, it is delegated to one of the existing standing
committees: investment, finance, or more likely, audit. There is debate in
the corporate world whether financial risk functions should reside in the
audit committee’s portfolio. An initial question is whether the audit
committee has the time, the skills, and the support to accomplish the job
effectively, given its other substantial responsibilities.181 In a sense,
auditing differs from risk oversight in that the former deals with past
activities and the latter focuses on future events—i.e. how to channel and
protect against the occurrence of unwanted possibilities and to strategize
how to deal with such events.
The actual calculation of endowment risk is conducted by risk managers,
who may be a part of a risk-management department or group within the
college or university’s investment management company or its external
investment advisors. Risk managers assess and measure the risks facing an
institution as a result of its investing activities, monitor the risks for
change, determine whether the institution has the resources to deal with the
risk, and alert senior management and the board about risk issues. 182
177. Id.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id.
180. For an excellent introduction to risk management and its failures in financial
institutions leading to the 2008 financial crisis, see James Fanto, Anticipating the
Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in Finance and Environmental
Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 735–36 (2009). See infra, note 182 for
definitions of some methods for evaluating endowment risk.
181. The Conference Board’s experience is that corporations that lodge risk
oversight in the audit committee have vastly differing views of what that responsibility
entails and their scope is all over the map. Additionally, the “audit committee financial
expert,” mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, may not have the skills necessary for evaluating
and assessing risk. CAROL BEAUMIER & JIM DELOACH, RISK OVERSIGHT: SHOULD
YOUR BOARD HAVE A SEPARATE RISK COMMITTEE? (2012), available at
http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V4N112.pdf&type=subsite.
182. See Fanto, supra note 180, at 735–36. Financial risk assessment includes both
quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitative tools use models based on statistical
measures to quantify the possibilities of loss based on past investments and financial
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Whichever board committee is responsible for risk oversight, it should
understand and identify all risks facing the institution, ensure that
appropriate limits are in place for financial investments, and evaluate the
institution’s risk management framework, compliance limits, and reporting
systems. It should attempt to protect the institution against catastrophic
loss, prepare for minimizing such losses, and evaluate the impact of such
losses on the institution’s constituencies. 183 If a board level risk oversight
committee is created, it might develop policies and parameters for investing
in particularly risky vehicles, which would be approved by the full board.
As with other board committees, the ROC would work closely with
external risk management firms retained to advise the committee.184
CONCLUSION
Decisions concerning a prudent or suitable level of risk for a particular
endowment should be reached only after thoughtful consideration of the
fund’s purposes and the institution’s tolerance of volatility of return. The

exposures. The most common is value at risk (“VaR”), which produces an
approximation of worst case scenarios by assessing at different confidence degrees the
minimum values of assets in the future. VaR provides an estimate of how much can be
lost in a single day. Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About The Money: Using
Behavioral Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial
Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 435–36 (2013). A problem with VaR is that it is
based on historical data about past investment performance and the assumption that
future deviations will follow a bell curve distribution. As with all quantitative
approaches, the quality of the inputted data affects the quality of the output. See
generally Edwards, supra note 129; Johnson, supra note 129.
Other techniques of risk assessment are stress testing and scenario analysis, which
have a more qualitative focus because they assess potential losses caused by adverse
situations and evaluate how the endowment would respond. Fanto, supra note 180, at
737. Stress testing is a procedure for evaluating the potential loss of a portfolio due to
underlying risk factors over a wide range of scenarios of risk, including those of very
low probability. Scenario analysis analyzes future events that result in a wide variety of
outcomes that would be unfavorable to the endowment’s value. Essentially, stress
testing and scenario analysis are forward-looking economic assessments that evaluate
whether the institution, in this case an endowment, is strong enough to endure difficult
economic conditions. Patkin, supra note 182, at 479. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 9–
11 (2009), available at http:// www.bis.org/publ/bcbs147.pdf (discussing stress testing
methodologies).
183. Cf. Packin, supra note 182, at 439.
184. It is unlikely that board members will be experts in risk assessment, but the
board committee should have access to internal risk management officials and would
retain external risk management experts to advise it and to work with the endowment’s
chief risk officer. The use of outside experts to assist board committees is a common
practice. Audit committees retain accounting firms and consultants. Nominating
committees often retain search firms to find board candidates. Compensation
committees retain compensation consultants, and investment committees delegate their
responsibilities to outside advisers and managers.
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appropriate level of risk should not be determined merely by financial
theories, general legal principles, or blind confidence in board members’
expertise in finance. Rather, it should be determined through an informed
consensus of the whole governing body as to which types of investments
are suitable for the endowment’s purposes and will give a sufficient
measure of comfort that the mission of the fund will be achieved. 185
This article does not suggest that institutions should abandon the
endowment model of investing or the Modern Portfolio Theory, or that any
specific level of endowment risk is appropriate or not. It merely
recommends that there should be deliberation of the institution’s risk
tolerance by the full board. Recognition of Justice Putnam’s warning in
Harvard College v. Amory, “[d]o what you will, the capital is at hazard,” 186
and the realization of the consequences of assuming too much risk are
likely to lead to more measured results, rather than a blind adherence to the
endowment model of investing and increased returns.

185. UPMIFA, supra note 1, at § 3(e)(1) (2006) (contains a list of steps that fund
trustees should engage in when determining their risk level).
186. Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 468 (1830). See discussion supra Part
II.
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APPENDIX I: UNIVERSITY BUDGET CUTS AND AUSTERITY EFFORTS
University
Boston
College

Cuts and Reductions*
Pay freeze on all staff making more than $75,000.1
Unspecified number of unfilled positions eliminated.1
Delayed construction of a science complex.1

Boston
University

51 persons laid off.1
200 positions eliminated.1
Hiring freeze in place since 2008.1
Halt of $130 million in new construction projects.1
250 lay-offs at affiliated BU School of Medicine.1

Brandeis

Over 82 lay-offs.1
Attempted closure of the Rose Art Museum and sale of
its 6,000 pieces. Value approximated at $350 million.1

Dartmouth

Laid off or eliminated 275 staff positions.1
Reduced hours for 107 employees.1
Encouraged 105 early retirements.1
Imposed a 2010 hiring freeze.1
Delay of renovations for 5 years.1
Postponement of new construction.1
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310 persons laid off.1
530 early retirements.1
103 persons had their hours reduced.1
Suspension of initiative to expand into Allston,**
resulting in postponement of expected jobs, stalled
economic development, idle use of land. The project was
expected to create 14,000-15,000 jobs over the next 50
years.1
275 employees laid-off; others forced to early
retirement.2
Cut hot breakfasts in undergraduate dining halls.2
Cut undergraduate academic advising.2
Cut student employment opportunities at university
libraries.2
Suspended university’s expansion into Allston.2
Cut staff hours at university libraries.2
Cut primary care division at university hospitals.2
Cut shuttle service for students at distant dorms.2
Cut funding for undergraduate dorms.2
Increased section sizes.2
Suspended annual conferences.2
Cancelled program that waived 3rd year tuition for law
students that met community service requirements and
pledged to go into public service.3
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135 staff laid off.1
Unquantified others have had their hours reduced.1
5% budget reductions in 2009; and 10-15% for the
following three years.2
Delayed renovations to undergraduate dorms.2
Salary freeze for highest-compensated faculty.2
Increase in student fees.2
Closed two branches of the library.2
30-50% reduction of admissions
spending.2

outreach

travel

Elimination of eight athletic teams.2
Princeton

Salary freezes for the best-compensated faculty and
staff.2
A freeze on construction.2
Reduction or elimination of scholarly activities not
related to teaching and research, including “certain
outside conferences and colloquia.”2
Reductions in undergraduate research opportunities.2
Reductions in graduate funding in the humanities.2
“Dramatic” reduction in campus civic engagement
funding.2
Reductions in outreach-related admissions travel.2

Stanford

Budget cuts across the university by 12-15%.2
12% reduction in staff size at the Graduate School of
Business including: cuts to travel, food, library services,
marketing activities, printing expenses.2
Hiring freezes for forty-nine ongoing staff searches.2
Leaving faculty vacancies unfilled.2
University layoffs of 350 administrative positions.2
“Dramatic” reductions in undergraduate peer advising.2
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Overall budget reduction of 5%; later raised to 7.5%.2
Suspension of capital projects for its business school,
museum, science building, and undergraduate dorms.2
Reduced hours for some student and permanent
employees.2
20% cuts to undergraduate government.2
Reduction of library digitization projects.2

* All employment figures are subject to revision.
** Economic Impacts of Harvard’s Allston Delays: Direct Earnings Loss is
approximated at ~$90,000,000 per delayed year; Total Regional Economic Loss is
approximated at ~$285,000,000 per delayed year.
1. Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, Educational Endowments and the
Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic Risks in the Shadow Banking System
(2011).
2. Peter Conti-Brown, Scarcity Amidst Wealth: The Law, Finance, and Culture of
Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis, 63 STAN. L. REV. 699 (2011).
3.Jennifer Levitz, Economy Tests Harvard—-Elite Universities See Recession’s Toll on
Endowments, Pinching Operating Costs, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2012, at A3.

